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The Canon of Dutch Christian 
Democracy 
 
‘Political activity with no knowledge of 
history nor self-reflection is like the life of a 
mayfly, that leaves no past and has no 
future.’ G. Puchinger (1981), Ontmoetingen 
met antirevolutionairen (Meetings with anti-
revolutionaries). Zutphen: Terra, p. 6. 
 
Christian Democracy in the Netherlands has a 
rich history that seems to be a source of 
inspiration to many. After completing the 
Canon of Dutch Christian Democracy, this was 
an indisputable fact. It is remarkable how 
combing through archives and faded 
documents can inspire and produce colourful 
reflections. We are convinced that this Canon 
will be an important beacon and source of 
inspiration for future generations. 
 
When Ruth Peetoom was elected CDA party 
chairman, she drew up a ten-point plan. One of 
the points was a Canon on Christian 
Democracy. Shortly after her inauguration as 
party chairman, this project was taken up by the 
Research Institute for the CDA and the CDA 
party headquarters. By the summer of 2011 a 
group of editors had been put together 
including Raymond Gradus (Director of the 
Research Institute of the 
CDA), George Harinck (Professor of History at 
the VU University Amsterdam), Hans-Martien 
ten Napel (Lecturer in Constitutional and 
Administrative law at Leiden University), 
Alexander van Kessel (researcher at the Centre 
for Parliamentary History) and Karin Hoentjen 
(Head of Policy at the CDA Party 
headquarters).These editors received excellent 
support from Remy Luyten (trainee at the 
Research Institute of the CDA) and Maaike 
Kamps (office manager at the Research Institute 
of the CDA). The objective of this editorial office 
was to present our heritage in forty lemmata, 
opening up the CDA to a wide group of 
interested people, both inside and outside the 
party. 
 
The history of Christian Democracy 
In order to understand how Christian 
Democracy in the Netherlands came into 
existence, we have taken the mid-nineteenth 
century as a starting point. An important date is 
the publication in 1847 of the book Ongeloof 
en Revolutie (Unbelief and Revolution) by 
Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer in which he let 
his religious beliefs permeate politics. To many, 
the legacy of Christian Democracy in the 
Netherlands can be traced back to Groen. In the 
lemmata that follow this political movement is 
outlined in more detail. Important milestones 
include the founding of the CDA (1980) and 
that of its predecessors ARP (1879), CHU (1908) 
and KVP (1945). More colour has been added to 
the Canon by the inclusion of other significant 
events such as the establishment of the Dutch 
‘equipe’ in Europe, and cabinets with a 
confessional character and confessional 
members. Attention is also devoted to policy 
issues such as ethical colonial politics, 
development cooperation and the new health 
care system in which Christian Democracy 
played a significant role. We also pause to look 
at reports that were a determining factor for 
Christian Democracy, such as Grondslag en 
karakter (1966), (Principles and Character) and 
Nieuwe wegen, vaste waarden (1995) (New 
roads, firm values). The Canon concludes with 
the formation conference of October 2010. 
When selecting the forty lemmata, the editors 
have had to make choices that are certainly 
open to discussion. But they believe that they 
have succeeded in setting out a varied and 
historically correct account of Christian 
Democracy in the Netherlands. 
 
We are grateful to the authors who all 
produced their own lemma with great 
enthusiasm while working to strict deadlines. 
That so many contributors, both inside and 
outside Christian Democratic circles, 
volunteered their services indicates that in 
every respect it has been a worthwhile 
undertaking to put our Christian Democratic 
heritage down in writing. We would also like to 
thank the members of the reading committee, 
Carla van Baalen (Professor of Parliamentary 
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History at Radboud University Nijmegen), Arie 
Oostlander (former director of the Research 
Institute of the CDA) and Gerrit Voerman 
(Professor in Development and Functioning of 
the Dutch and European political party systems 
at Groningen University), who read through the 
draft and provided expert commentary on its 
content. 
 
Each lemma is illustrated and contains 
suggestions for further reading. The illustrations 
not only complement the text but often also tell 
their own story. Our thanks too, go to all the 
people and organisations who were prepared 
to search through near-forgotten archives to 
provide us with visual material. In particular, we 
would like to thank the Historical 
Documentation Centre for Dutch Protestantism 
(HDC), the Catholic Documentation Centre 
(KDC) and the Documentation Centre for Dutch 
Political Parties (DNPP) for permission to use 
illustrations. Remy Luyten and Maaike Kamps 
added the illustrations to the lemmata, assisted 
by Hanneke van Os,who also took responsibility 
for the layout. Marcel Migo was prepared to go 
through the manuscript meticulously, providing 
commentary on its language content. The 
Canon is a collaboration between the Centre for 
European Studies and the European People’s 
Party political foundation. A contribution was 
also received from the Stichting dr. Abraham 
Kuyperfonds. These organisations accept no 
responsibility for the content of the Canon. We 
would like to thank them all for their support, 
without which this project would not have been 
possible. 
 
Not the end, just the beginning 
Before you lies an achievement which we, the 
editors, are justly proud of. We hope that the 
Canon of Dutch Christian Democracy will not be 
the end point, but more a starting point for a 
discussion of the importance of our Christian 
Democratic heritage. Together with the 
Steenkampinstituut, the CDA’s training institute, 
we will look at how the Canon can be used for 
training purposes in the party. The Historical 
Documentation Centre of the VU University 
Amsterdam will also include the Canon in its 
teaching syllabus. This can lead to new insights 
and historical interpretations, possibly even 
new lemmata. We invite you to pass on your 
suggestions via www.cda.nl/wi or via our e-
mail address: canon.wi@cda.nl. Because this is 
exactly what we want: history to encourage 
reflection and thus bring it to life.  
 
The Canon was translated into English in 
summer 2012. Our thanks go to the translators 
Susan Hunt and Wendy Rodger. We would also 
like to thank Maaike Kamps and Hanneke van 
Os for their editorial work and the layout.  
 
 
Editorial Board, April 2012. 
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1847  Unbelief and Revolution 
 
‘Your majesty! In the work I humbly present 
to you’ Groen van Prinsterer wrote on 16 
Augustus 1847 to King Willem II, ‘I have 
tried to demonstrate that fear of God, 
equally in constitutional and international 
law, is the rudiment of learning and the 
prerequisite of law, freedom and happiness.’ 
 
This positive description accompanied the best 
known book by Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer 
(1801-1876), the title of which however chiefly 
illustrated the reverse: Unbelief and Revolution. 
This book was the result of a series of historical 
lectures given in 1846 over a number of 
Saturday evenings in the library of Groen’s 
house on the Korte Vijverberg in The Hague. 
This was not the first time he had made a causal 
connection between unbelief and the French 
Revolution, but in the winter of 1845/46 he 
took a closer look in order to explain the 
connection from a historical perspective. After 
his lectures proved to be a success, they were 
published by the Leiden publishing company 
Luchtmans in 1847. Since then Groen’s opinion 
has found its way from his library to today’s 
digital world and from his stately aristocratic 
language to editions in modern English and 
contemporary Dutch.  
 
Unbelief and Revolution marks the beginning of 
the Christian Democratic tradition in the 
Netherlands. The major influence of this book 
lies in the two beliefs that have become a 
distinguishing feature of this tradition. Firstly, 
the connection between religion and politics. 
To Groen, this connection was not a personal 
interest of his, but he believed that the very 
nature of religion meant that it had to be part 
of the political structures in society. Believing 
this, Groen opposed the prevailing belief at the 
time that although religion was morally 
formative for citizenship, the state 
administration as such lay outside the scope of 
religion; or more specifically: politics was the 
domain of reason and religion was a disruptive 
force that was to be barred. But by making a 
direct link between unbelief and revolution, 
Groen argued that the state could only provide 
law and order if the roots of its administration 
lay in religion. Taking this line, Christian 
Democracy has always claimed that religion 
should not be excluded from the public 
domain, but should play a formative role within 
it. 
 
Unbelief and Revolution 
marks the beginning 
of Christian Democracy 
in the Netherlands 
 
The significance of Unbelief and Revolution lies 
secondly in the belief that a religious 
background influences political actions. 
Ideological choices have consequences, not just 
when someone wants to firmly impose these, 
but by the mere fact that an ideology has its 
own dynamic. Unbelief in the context of a revolt 
against God and against order in reality must, 
according to Groen’s reasoning, lead to 
revolution. His book therefore also offers an 
insight into the nature and effects of a political 
ideology. From this perspective, Christian 
Democracy has always paid close attention to 
ideological motives in politics, not just its own, 
but also those of its political opponents. It is no 
surprise that Groen’s work came into its own 
again during the Second World War: looking at 
the ideological motives of the occupying force, 
it was clear that its resulting aims could only 
lead to injustice and cruelty. When the Anti 
Revolutionary Party was forced underground in 
1941, Colijn’s advice was ‘Regular meetings and 
thorough study of Unbelief and Revolution’. 
 
Groen’s Unbelief and Revolution persisted as a 
concept in Anti Revolutionary and Christian 
Historical circles until well into the twentieth 
century and both parties honoured him as their 
father. Though the Catholic political leader 
Schaepman in 1876 criticised the denial in 
Groen’s adage: ‘Not a statesman, but a 
confessor of the Gospel!’ referring to it as a 
‘Genevan streak’, today Groen is considered the 
progenitor of the entire Dutch Christian 
Democratic tradition.  
 
 
George Harinck 
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1868  Education mandate 
 
The Pastoral letter of 22 July 1868 on 
Catholic education was not only a decisive 
step by church leaders in the ‘school 
struggle’, but it also ushered in the 
beginning of political collaboration between 
Catholics and Protestants 
 
Since 1806, national education had been the 
task of government and served to ‘educate all 
in Christian and social virtues’. Protestants 
supported this ideal, because it reflected the 
enlightened orthodoxy that characterized the 
Dutch Reformed Church until the mid century; 
Catholics supported it because in the Catholic 
regions education was, in fact, Catholic. In 
addition, it was very important for the Catholics 
to participate in the development of the young 
nation state. Both Protestants and Catholics 
would be confronted with an increasingly 
orthodox movement from within which, in the 
worst case, led to divisions in the church during 
the Secession (1834) and the ‘Doleantie’ 
(secession of the Dutch Reformed Church) 
(1886), which in the second case reinforced the 
orientation towards ‘Rome’ (Ultramontanism).  
 
After 1848, the Dutch Catholics were initially 
sympathetic towards the liberals, upon whose 
initiative freedom of religion had been 
anchored in the constitution. Bishops were 
appointed as a result of this in 1853. They 
sorted things out internally first - the Catholic 
Netherlands had been managed from Rome for 
centuries as a ‘mission region’. Meanwhile, 
Catholic sympathy for the liberals diminished. 
Their national participation was placed under 
too many liberal conditions; education based 
on Catholic principles, in particular, was 
obstructed. When threatened with losing the 
Papal State, Pope Pius IX became extremely 
anti-liberal which only reinforced their 
objections. His position resulted in the 
encyclical Quanta Cura (8 December 1864) with 
an appended list of errors (Syllabus Errorum). In 
relation to education, one error was ‘that 
Catholics could approve of a children’s 
education separated from the Catholic religion 
and the power of the Church, and where 
knowledge of unadorned natural things and the 
objectives of temporal earthly life are 
exclusively, or at least principally the intended 
aim’. 
 
‘So that children do not… miss the essential 
religious education’ 
 
Ultramontanism became the guiding principle 
of the Catholics. The ecclesiastical 
reorganisation was concluded in 1865 with the 
establishment of a Provincial (i.e. Dutch) Council 
which, among other things, ordained that 
Catholics were to send their children to Catholic 
schools, ‘so that children do not grow up in 
ignorance, nor miss the essential religious 
education’. The orthodox Protestant Vereniging 
ter Bevordering van het Christelijk Nationaal 
Schoolonderwijs (1861) and the Union Een 
School met den Bijbel (1879) preferred separate 
Protestant education to state education. The 
bishops did the same in 1868 with their 
education mandate. ‘It is necessary that a 
Catholic child receives a Catholic education. 
One simple way to achieve this is in a Catholic 
school’. But they were realistic enough to admit 
that this was not practical everywhere: ‘if need 
be, a non-Catholic school may be attended 
provided that nothing is taught in that school 
which is contrary to the Roman Catholic religion 
and morals.’ This Pastoral letter also heralded 
the beginning of the end of the Liberal- 
Catholic movement in politics. Instead, 
Catholics and orthodox Protestants found each 
other in their fight for freedom of education, 
culminating in the People’s Petition of 1878. 
They presented 465,000 signatures to King 
Willem III to block a liberally-slanted law on 
education that restricted free Christian 
education even further. The petition failed, but 
collaboration between Catholics and 
Protestants had been born.  
 
 
Lodewijk Winkeler 
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1879  Founding of the ARP 
 
On 3 April 1879 some thirty representatives 
from anti-revolutionary electoral 
associations, journals and greater regional 
associations gathered in the Kunsten en 
Wetenschappen building in Utrecht. Those 
present adopted a manifesto written by 
Abraham Kuyper. The first national party 
organisation had been born. 
 
The founding of this first modern political party 
in 1879 is generally seen as a milestone in the 
history of the Dutch political party system, with 
its ideological politicizing and party political 
organisations. From the 1850s onwards 
electoral associations became established 
throughout the country that were linked to 
Groen van Prinsterer, who fought for the 
adoption of the antirevolutionary principle: ‘The 
Gospel against the revolution’. Political parties 
did not yet exist. At the very most, there were 
political schools of thought that came into 
being because members of parliament took a 
stance on political issues. There were three 
main movements: liberal, conservative and anti-
revolutionary. Catholics mainly supported the 
conservative or liberal schools of thought.  
 
Members of parliament acted independently, 
separate to parliamentary parties or party 
organisations. From 1850 onwards, there were 
electoral associations that strived to get their 
preferred members of parliament elected. The 
Netherlands had a district system which meant 
that elections were a local affair. After a while, 
the name of an electoral association or its 
slogan indicated its political flavour. For 
instance, an electoral association called 
‘Constitution’ was liberal, an association called 
‘Fatherland and King’ was conservative and one 
called ‘Defending freedom, supported by the 
Bible’ was anti-revolutionary. Collaboration 
between antirevolutionary electoral 
associations within an electoral district was 
limited to discussions on the joint nomination 
of a candidate. The bond that did exist was the 
mutual link with Groen van Prinsterer and the 
gradual clarification of opinions. The catalyst in 
this process was the struggle for positive 
Christian education. The anti-revolutionaries 
turned their backs on the notion of an 
ideologically neutral school and aimed for 
schools with a clear religious character. Initially 
they pursued this aim through the neutral 
public schools and later through private 
schools. Everyone should have the right to raise 
their children according to their own beliefs. 
Which explains the anti-revolutionary electoral 
associations with names like ‘Freedom and 
Justice’ and ‘Justice for all’. In 1869 a national 
committee led by Baron De Geer van Jutphaas 
from Utrecht made an inventory of all linked 
electoral associations and the first nationally 
coordinated campaign began. Two years later, 
Groen van Prinsterer broke with the 
conservative members of parliament and 
argued that only three parliamentary 
candidates could bear the predicate ‘anti-
revolutionary’, one of those being Kuyper. In 
the meantime, Kuyper devoted himself to the 
formal merging of all anti-revolutionary 
electoral associations, firstly via the ‘Anti-School 
Law League’ (an organisation that wanted to 
change the constitution so that private 
education would be the norm, rather than non-
denominational public education) and later via 
an interim central committee of anti-
revolutionary electoral associations.  
 
At the time the ARP was founded a manifesto 
was adopted containing the anti-revolutionary 
constitutional principles, as well as draft 
regulations for the central committee of anti-
revolutionary electoral associations. From then 
on prospective members of parliament had to 
endorse the manifesto. These developments 
provided an impetus for both the idealization 
and democratization of politics. The anti-
revolutionaries brought the political debate out 
of the upper echelons of society and made it 
accessible to all who were sympathetic to the 
principles of the party organisation and who 
wanted to be part of it. Political participation no 
longer depended on background and social 
status; agreeing with the party manifesto was 
what counted. 
 
 
Rienk Janssens 
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1883  Proeve van een program 
 
‘Like the first steps of a newly-hatched chick 
out in the field’, is how in 1883 H.J.A.M. 
Schaepman - priest, politician, poet and 
professor of church history - described in 
well-chosen yet modest words, his attempt 
with his Proeve van een program to outline 
a programme for a new Catholic party. 
 
‘This “Trial Programme” is indeed no more than 
just that. Life, with all its struggles and changes, 
is reflected here in full’, Schaepman said almost 
diffidently. And indeed, the actual Trial contains 
only seventeen articles covering six pages; the 
rest of the book - just less than a hundred 
pages long - is taken up with explanatory notes. 
The Trial itself is also rather searching in tone; 
at times not even consistent. It sets out the 
contours of a rudimentary party – both its 
principles and programme. No other document 
has had more influence on the development of 
the Catholic party political system in the 
Netherlands, even though it was not until one 
year after the death of Schaepman in 1903 that 
a national organisation of Catholic electoral 
associations was set up, and it took until 1926 
before the desired party organisation was in 
place.  
 
This development was a slow process. For a 
long time, Schaepman had been a progressive 
loner in a conservative group that was hindered 
by the conservatism of the episcopate and by 
Schaepman’s own awkward character. The 
bishops and many conservative Catholics did 
not believe in collaborating with Protestants. 
Inspired by the German Zentrum (and fearful of 
anti-Catholic reactions) Schaepman, however, 
did not strive for a Catholic ‘religious party’ but 
rather a broad Christian middle party, in 
principle. Even though he must have realized 
that such cooperation with the Protestant 
‘traditional enemy’ would by no means be 
possible at that time and that the German 
example, which was interdenominational in 
theory, was actually a Catholic party in practice. 
But this was the only opportunity he saw to 
give Catholic ‘outsiders’ a place in the Dutch 
political arena. This was how Schaepman 
introduced the notion of a Christian coalition: 
‘This is why they (the Catholics) want a political 
programme, a programme that does not place 
them in opposition to the Protestants, but in 
opposition to the Liberals and Conservatives 
who in vague terms espouse liberal principles 
and practise them half-heartedly; a programme 
that is anti-revolutionary through and through, 
but which acknowledges its own roots, shows 
its true colour, and is true to its character.’ And 
he spoke to the anti-revolutionaries with the 
words: ‘In the struggle against the revolutionary 
State we wish to see you fighting on our side. 
We can forgive your discourtesies… Because 
this means everything to us.’ In other words: 
the Catholic programme had to be attractive to 
orthodox Protestants as well. 
 
The Trial was a fine 
example of compromise 
and power politics 
 
The well-known Catholic historian L.J. Rogier 
described the Proeve as ‘ingenious, almost 
perversely ingenious’. Schaepman offered 
Abraham Kuyper ten thousand Catholic votes 
that in the district system would otherwise be 
worthless, and further speculated that he could 
persuade his religious companions to vote 
antirevolutionary as long as it was needed and 
as often as he asked. In that sense, the Proeve 
was a fine example of compromise and power 
politics. With it Schaepman knew how to tempt 
the anti-revolutionaries, and Kuyper in 
particular, into a coalition which would 
eventually give Dutch Catholics the powerful 
political position they desired. 
 
 
Jan Ramakers 
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1888  Mackay cabinet takes 
office 
 
In 1888 the first C Christian coalition cabinet 
took office: the Mackay cabinet. After years 
of strife between them the Catholics and 
anti-revolutionaries had formed a ‘monster 
union’ and won the election, leading to an 
unprecedented situation in Dutch politics. 
This cabinet’s most significant achievements 
were the 1889 Labour Act and the Mackay 
Act providing subsidies for private 
education. 
 
The election of 1888 was held following the 
constitutional amendment of 1887. As a result 
of this amendment, the number of voters rose 
from 12 to 24 per cent of the adult male 
population. The Catholics and anti-
revolutionaries formed a union: in the districts 
they would vote for each other’s candidates to 
prevent their political opponents, the Liberals, 
from winning. 
 
‘Private education, 
introduced and developed 
as a result of private 
initiatives, should 
be supported by the State’ 
 
The Mackay cabinet comprised four anti-
revolutionaries, two Catholics and two 
Conservatives. The most important results of 
this cabinet were in the fields of education and 
social legislation. Since 1848, at the initiative of 
the Liberals, freedom of education had been 
included in the Constitution: everyone had the 
right to set up a school. But private schools 
were not entitled to government funding: the 
Liberals thought this was contrary to the 
Constitution. And so Christian or Catholic 
schools were in an unfavourable competitive 
position compared to the non-denominational 
public schools which were financed by the 
government. For many decades attempts had 
been made to rectify this situation.  
 
The Mackay Act of 1889 ensured that an equal 
amount of treasury funding was provided for 
private schools as was already being spent on 
public schools. However there was no equality 
in the amount of funding from local 
governments. In practice this meant that only a 
third of the costs were covered. Pupils at 
private schools accounted for 27 per cent of the 
total. In the explanatory memorandum the 
government considered this to be good news: 
‘the large increase in private schools 
demonstrates how much parents appreciate 
this type of education for their children. Private 
education, that was introduced and developed 
as a result of private initiatives, should be 
supported by the state, instead of being 
opposed. The state has a significant interest in 
the education of the public and is only able to 
ensure that there is a public school available 
everywhere and at all times. But it is certainly 
not its mission to obstruct private education 
nor to hinder it to the disadvantage of the 
nation’s progress.’  
 
In the area of social legislation, the cabinet 
established the 1889 Labour Act. The Roman 
Catholic Minister of Justice G.L.M.H. Ruijs van 
Beerenbroek was responsible for this. Until then 
there had only been one social Act: the Van 
Houten Child Labour Act (1874). It was 
generally acknowledged that there were social 
abuses everywhere. The pressing question for 
the confessional parties was whether it was up 
to the government to combat this. The Labour 
Act of 1889 answered this question 
unequivocally: the Act contained provisions to 
stop excessive and dangerous use of child and 
female labour.  
 
The significance of the Mackay cabinet was not  
just its achievements in education and social 
legislation. New political relationships 
developed in which Catholics and anti-
revolutionaries worked together for the first 
time in a cabinet with the Liberals in opposition: 
right-wing against left-wing. 
 
 
Andries Postma 
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1891  Christian Social Congress 
and Rerum Novarum 
 
‘Thou shalt not kill, nor kill the worker 
socially.’ More than a thousand congress 
attendees listened with bated breath to 
Kuyper’s opening address at the Christian 
Social Congress. Both this conference, 
organised in November 1891 by Dutch 
Protestants, and the encyclical Rerum 
Novarum published in the same year, form a 
reference point and a rich source of 
inspiration in the Christian-Social tradition. 
 
A deep economic recession and the lack of 
social and political reform caused great social 
unrest in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. There was a series of strikes, protesting 
unemployed workers marched through the 
streets, and the police and military police were 
forced to take a tough stance throughout the 
country. Protestant leaders were worried 
because they appeared to be losing their grip 
on the nation. Many workers appeared to be 
susceptible to the revolutionary propaganda 
coming from what was often fiercely atheistic 
socialism. Although there seemed to be less 
‘fermentation’ among Dutch Catholic workers, 
fellow believers with a social conscience 
realized the seriousness of the social issue and 
Rerum Novarum formed an important 
inspiration in this matter. 
The Dutch Workers Union Patrimonium 
founded in 1876 – orthodox Protestant in 
character and the largest labour union in those 
days – recognized the appeal of the left. As a 
result it wanted to see the process of finally 
giving the working class a political voice and 
improving their living conditions through social 
legislation speeded up. The anti-revolutionary 
leader Abraham Kuyper realized that he had to 
choose: either for the Conservative gentlemen 
with the doublebarrelled names or for the 
Protestant ordinary folk. By organising a social 
congress, Kuyper opted for the people and in 
this way hoped to keep the Protestant workers 
on board. The congress took place from 9-12 
November 1891 in the Frascati Theatre in 
Amsterdam. Although the Social Congress 
adopted important resolutions – it recognized, 
for example, the long disputed right to strike – 
Kuyper`s opening address, ‘The social issue and 
the Protestant religion’, remains the most well 
known. The Social Congress was an important 
source of inspiration to Protestant Christian 
Social leaders such as Rev. A.S. Talma and CNV 
chairman M. Ruppert.  
 
Finally the process of giving 
the working class a political 
voice was hastened 
 
Kuyper`s speech, often applauded as a 
masterpiece, became a classic in Christian 
Social thinking because of its ‘structural 
criticism’ of society. He particularly condemned 
the consequences of the French Revolution 
which had undermined the Christian cultural 
foundations and traditional social alliances such 
as the guilds. Pope Leo XIII had already in that 
year in the encyclical Rerum Novarum put 
forward an organic model of society as 
opposed to the liberal laisser faire and 
individualism. This Catholic social teaching 
influenced Catholics such as A.M.A.J. Ariëns, 
P.J.M. Aalberse and H.A. Poels.  
 
Despite their differences in religious 
background, terminology and language, Kuyper 
and Pope Leo XIII basically wanted the same: to 
block liberalism that left the worker in the cold, 
and socialism that drove the worker into the 
harness of the class system. Kuyper and Leo XIII 
wanted to give both Protestant and Catholic 
workers, as orthodox believers and respected 
citizens, a place in the modern, plural societies 
that were emerging in Europe. Kuyper`s speech 
and the Rerum Novarum have remained 
celebrated because they did not deal with 
concrete situations and solutions in any great 
detail. As a result they became timeless 
documents that have inspired generations of 
Christian Social thinkers and practitioners, and 
to which they could turn.  
 
 
Rolf van der Woude ‘ 
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1894  Rift within the ARP 
 
The battle surrounding extending the right 
to vote during the April 1894 election led to 
a rift within the ARP. After the election, 
eight of the fifteen 
elected anti-revolutionaries united under the 
leadership of A.F. de Savornin Lohman in a 
separate parliamentary party. This led to the 
founding of the Christelijk-Historische Unie 
(Christian Historical Union) in 1908. 
 
There were various causes for the rift within the 
ARP. Firstly, the immediate cause: extending the 
right to vote. Kuyper stated that he was in 
favour of this to the extent permitted by the 
Constitution. His opponents were against it and 
moreover stood by the anti-revolutionary 
position on the right to vote for heads of 
families. There was also a personal dimension 
to the conflict. For some time there had been 
friction between Kuyper, party leader and 
ideologist who put principle first, and Lohman 
who, as a member of parliament, was more 
open to political feasibility. The differences 
between the two men grew after Lohman 
joined the Mackay cabinet in 1890 against 
Kuyper’s wishes.  
 
Fundamental differences in political views 
played a role in the background to the conflict. 
Lohman and his allies were part of the tradition 
surrounding dignitaries in the nineteenth 
century. The political party was subordinate to 
the parliamentary party and the representatives 
were not in the House primarily to represent 
the interests of the party, but the general 
interest. This view clashed with that of Kuyper, 
who saw the parliamentary party as subordinate 
to the political party and wanted to lead both 
from outside the House. This difference 
between the conservative ‘droite’ and the more 
democratic ‘gauche’ ran parallel with social 
differences. Most of the highbred members of 
parliament within the ARP, the ‘gentlemen’ with 
the double- barrelled names, belonged to the 
‘droite’. 
 
Kuyper saw the parliamentary 
party as subordinate to 
the political party 
 
Although Lohman had left the Dutch Reformed 
Church together with Kuyper at the time of the 
‘Doleantie’ in 1886 and had become Christian 
Reformed, the differences between Dutch 
Reformed and Christian Reformed did play a 
part in their rift. Dutch Reformed anti-
revolutionaries mostly followed Lohman, and 
the Christian Reformed remained with Kuyper 
and the ARP. Kuyper`s democratic vision 
appealed to the Dutch Reformed and they 
remained true to the leader of the ‘Doleantie’. 
The political battle became caught up in the 
religious battle, so that alongside the mainly 
Christian Reformed ARP, an almost entirely 
Dutch Reformed Christian Historical Union 
(CHU) was formed. The CHU stood for the unity 
of the Dutch nation. The party was opposed to 
the antithesis of Kuyper who contrasted 
Christian ideology with non-Christian, modern 
ideology. In Christian historical thinking, the 
two essential characteristics of the Dutch nation 
were Protestantism as evolved in the Dutch 
Reformed Church and the House of Orange; 
both fruits of God`s leadership throughout 
history. The CHU rejected majority rule. The 
Netherlands was not Protestant because the 
majority of the population were Protestant, but 
because of its history and because the 
Protestant notion of freedom was embedded in 
the Constitution. This view was concisely 
expressed by the slogan ‘Not the majority, but 
the authority’.  
 
The importance that the CHU attached to the 
unity of the nation meant that the government 
had to represent the interests of all parties. A 
single party vision did not fit with the views of 
the CHU. As no constitutional policy could be 
derived from the Bible, Christians were free to 
take differing views. The notion of party 
discipline had no place here, so CHU members 
of parliament were free to vote differently. In 
addition, the CHU was pro-government 
because the government was God`s servant and 
an attitude of distrust was not befitting.  
 
 
Ron de Jong 
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1901  The Kuyper cabinet 
 
‘The case is clear to us: shut out the Roman 
Catholics from present-day Christianity, then 
Protestant Christianity will be bound hand 
and foot, and forever at the mercy of the 
unbelieving majority, and all resistance to 
the revolutionary principle will be 
purposeless’, Kuyper said in his address to 
delegates on 17 April 1901. 
 
After the fall of the Mackay cabinet in 1891, it 
would be another ten years before a new 
coalition cabinet, the Kuyper cabinet, was 
formed. The reason was partly the divisions in 
anti-revolutionary and Catholic circles. The 
cabinet was formed after the election in which 
the confessional parties (right wing) had won 
no less than 58 of the total of 100 seats. Kuyper, 
who had gradually cast aside his initial 
reservations with regard to working with the 
Catholics, defended the new coalition by 
referring to the notion ‘Antithesis’. He believed 
that when entering into a political union, the 
leading question ought to be whether a certain 
group wished to acknowledge the sovereignty 
of God as the leading principle in the 
constitution. Considered in this light, 
Protestants and Catholics, though acting as 
separate organisations, were politically more 
dependent on each other than one might 
initially expect on the grounds of their religious 
beliefs and history.  
 
The Kuyper cabinet, that took office on 1 
August 1901, developed important legislation 
in the field of education. Its Higher Education 
Act, giving graduates from the VU University 
Amsterdam, founded by Kuyper in 1880, the 
same rights as students who graduated from a 
state university, was initially rejected as a bill by 
the Upper House of the Dutch parliament. But 
when the Upper House was dissolved by 
Kuyper, the Liberals lost their majority. However 
when the cabinet submitted the rejected bill 
once more, it was adopted by both Houses.  
 
In contrast, there was significantly less progress 
in the field of social legislation, possibly 
because during the cabinet formation the 
Department of Employment was placed under 
Kuyper’s Ministry of Home Affairs which also 
included Education. It is also likely that the 
tension between Kuyper`s vision of an organic 
society on the one hand, and the social reality 
on the other, was an aggravating factor. The 
vision of an organic society required a 
restrained approach by government. Civil 
society had also not fully matured and was to 
some extent even intractable.  
 
The manner in which the cabinet reacted to the 
rail strikes in 1903 also did little to contribute to 
its social standing. The cabinet did not submit 
bills to the Lower House to forbid civil servants 
and rail workers from striking in writing, as was 
customary, but in person on behalf of the 
Queen. After a failed new rail strike these 
‘coercive acts’ were adopted in quick 
succession.  
 
As a result the disparity between the 
confessionals and the socialists grew. In more 
general terms too, the cabinet went on to 
become one of the most controversial cabinets 
in the political history of the Netherlands. The 
election contest in 1905 was completely 
dominated by support for Kuyper or not. When 
the left wing joined forces during the re-count, 
the right wing came no further than 48 seats. 
On 3 July 1905 the Kuyper cabinet handed in its 
resignation. Following a short intermezzo, the 
Heemskerk cabinet (1908-1913) became the 
third and last coalition cabinet before World 
War One broke out. As with the previous 
Kuyper cabinet, in addition to support from the 
anti-revolutionaries and Catholics, this cabinet 
enjoyed the loyal support of the Christian 
Historical members of parliament.  
 
 
Hans-Martien ten Napel 
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1902  Ethical politics 
 
In 1902 A.W.F. Idenburg became Minister 
for the Colonies in the Kuyper cabinet. 
Idenburg, an anti-revolutionary, based his 
policy on the principles of ethical politics, as 
previously formulated by Kuyper. The 
development of the Dutch East Indies and 
the ‘uplifting’ of its population became the 
guiding principle of Dutch colonial policy. 
 
In 1879 Abraham Kuyper had already called for 
a radical change in the policy on the colonies. 
Until then, the Dutch East Indies had primarily 
been viewed as a colony that provided for a 
‘surplus’ on the Dutch budget and delivered 
huge profits to the Dutch 
cultuurmaatschappijen (estate management 
companies). Kuyper believed that the 
exploitation of the Dutch East Indies for the 
benefit of the Dutch public treasury had to 
come to an end. He wrote in Ons program - the 
young Anti-revolutionary Party`s manifesto - 
that the Netherlands had a ‘moral duty’ to 
educate the people of the Dutch East Indies as 
a selfless guardian. Throughout this process, 
the guardian was to manage the property of 
the pupil. The ultimate objective remained: 
independence of the pupil. (Thereby implicitly 
acknowledging the finite nature of the colonial 
relationship!)  
 
Besides Kuyper, others like Multatuli in his book 
Max Havelaar and liberal politicians like Van 
Deventer had strongly criticized the exploitation 
of the Dutch East Indies. In a controversial 
article‘ Een eereschuld’(A Debt of Honour), Van 
Deventer had called for repayment of the 
money that had been siphoned-off from the 
Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands. In the 
Queen’s speech of 1901 which marked the 
beginning of the Kuyper cabinet’s term of 
office, Kuyper’s views were officially declared to 
be a part of government policy. The 
Netherlands had a ‘moral obligation’ towards 
the Dutch East Indies. Idenburg, who had 
become a member of parliament in 1901 
following a military career in Indonesia, 
expressed this in his own words as the ‘uplifting 
of the native population’. To him this also 
meant the conversion of the Dutch East Indies 
to Christianity.  
Four terms are often used to summarize ethical 
politics: pacification, irrigation, emigration and 
education. Education and medical assistance 
were organized and extended. There was an 
investigation into the causes of poverty. A 
resolute welfare policy was set up with special 
attention devoted to the construction of roads, 
railway tracks and harbours. Irrigation works 
enlarged the acreage for the cultivation of rice 
and native agriculture and industry was 
stimulated through providing loans, 
information, as well as technical and agricultural 
education. A labour inspectorate was 
introduced to offer labourers (‘coolies’) some 
form of protection. The Javanese were to be 
encouraged to leave their over-populated 
island and live elsewhere. The Netherlands took 
over 40 million Dutch guilders of debt from the 
Dutch East Indies. Where in the outlying 
regions Dutch authority did not yet prevail, this 
would systematically be implemented. This was 
the context for the first term referred to above: 
‘pacification’. In practice, this entailed a series 
of expeditions, which in some cases - in Aceh 
for example - led to a massacre. This made the 
ethical policy duplicitous. To the ‘ethicists’ of 
the day, the colonial expeditions were a logical 
step: the ‘uplifting’ of the population could only 
be achieved provided that the ‘pax neerlandica’ 
had first been established. A second duplicity 
concerned education. Western education for 
the native elite would become a breeding 
ground for nationalists who had only one ideal: 
independence. In other words, ethical politics 
supplied the weapons with which the Dutch 
would later be opposed. Many, particularly in 
business circles, would hear nothing of 
independence for Indonesia and became 
increasingly fierce in their opposition to the 
ethical policy. This would irrevocably lead to the 
dissolution of Dutch authority. 
 
It is certain that Idenburg also bore this 
possibility in mind. Nevertheless, he genuinely 
looked forward to the ‘awakening’ of the native 
society.  
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1917  Pacification 
 
‘Our nation’s history tells us, that discord 
exists where heterogeneous elements are 
squeezed into one and the same straitjacket; 
but when everyone, within the limits of 
order, of course, is given freedom and 
allowed to do as they please, then we can all 
live together in tolerance’, according to 
Minister Baron Æ. Mackay in 1889 in the 
Upper House. 
 
When the Mackay Act was passed in 1889, an 
important problem was removed from the 
school funding issue. The Act accepted the 
principle that private education could be 
subsidized by the government. It would still 
take until 1917, however, during the so-called 
Pacification, before there would be total 
equality between public and private education. 
The direct background to the Pacification goes 
back to 1913, when during the election of that 
year 55 non-confessional (left-wing) members 
were elected and the right wing came no 
further than 45 seats. A cabinet under the 
leadership of the Liberal Prime Minister, P.W.A. 
Cort van der Linden came into office. To 
achieve a permanent solution to the issue of 
school funding, an education committee was 
established on which all groups represented in 
parliament had a seat, with De Savornin 
Lohman as vice-chairman. The committee 
succeeded in 1916 in almost unanimously 
arriving at the recommendation in its report 
that private schools should henceforth be put 
on the same footing as public schools. 
Honouring this traditional right-wing wish 
cleared the way to introduce the left-wing 
desire for universal suffrage for men and 
passive suffrage for women. In addition, the 
constitutional obstruction to women’s suffrage 
would be removed. 
 
The combined proposals were considered to be 
so important that the parties agreed among 
themselves that at the next election the 
composition of the Lower House would, as far 
as possible, remain unchanged. And this made 
it possible, after certain sections had been 
amended during the first reading, for the bill to 
be passed with no problems in the autumn of 
1917 at the second reading. Partly influenced 
by the principle of pluralism that had been 
established for education by the constitutional 
revision of 1917, in the following years the 
Netherlands went on to acquire the 
characteristics of what could be called a 
pluriform democracy in other areas. The state 
developed respect for the various religious 
andsecular ideologies in society and their 
affiliated organisations in a steadily increasing 
number of areas, such as broadcasting, while at 
the same time maintaining a distance.  
 
In this way, either consciously or unconsciously, 
the lesson had been learned from the nation’s 
history that Mackay had pointed out in 1889. 
Until then, the problem had been that the state 
did not offer the four minorities that had come 
to the fore in the course of the nineteenth 
century – Protestants, Catholics, Liberals and 
Socialists – an equal right to shape their 
identity, also in the public domain. After the 
Pacification in 1917, Protestants and Catholics, 
and others, were given ample opportunity to do 
so, thereby marking a pivotal moment in the 
political history of the Netherlands. Meanwhile, 
the constitutional revision in 1917 had also 
changed the electoral system making it easier 
for smaller factions to successfully take part in 
elections. The ‘first past the post’ system with 
districts was replaced by a system of 
proportional representation in which the entire 
country was a constituency. One of the 
consequences of this was the founding of the 
Staatkundig-Gereformeerde Partij (Political 
Reformed Party) (SGP). After the general 
election of 1918, partly due to the stronger 
representation of Catholics, the coalition 
controlled exactly half the seats in the Lower 
House. 
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1922  The last resort 
 
At the General Meeting of the Association of 
RC National Electoral District Organisations 
in May 1922, W.H. Nolens, party chairman in 
the Lower House, declared that only in the 
last resort would the Catholic parliamentary 
party collaborate with the Sociaal-
Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) 
(Social Democratic Workers’ Party) in 
government. This ‘doctrine of the last resort’ 
was applied negatively during the cabinet 
formations of 1925 and 1935 and positively 
in 1939 when for, the first time, two social 
democrats joined the cabinet. 
 
Nolens’ statement was in reaction to the 
proposal of the Association Board to forbid 
collaboration with the SDAP. The bishops had 
already done this the previous year. The reason 
was the failed ‘coup d’état’ by SDAP leader P.J. 
Troelstra in November 1918. The SDAP was 
therefore prepared to revolt; it was also against 
the monarchy, in favour of disarmament and – 
worst of all – irreligious. Sharing power with 
such a party in government had to be ruled out. 
The Catholic parliamentary party in the Lower 
House, however, did not want its hands tied by 
the Association Board and the episcopate. At 
the Association meeting of May 1922, 
parliamentary party member D.A.P.N. Koolen 
managed to have the Association’s proposal 
amended: collaboration between only Catholics 
and social democrats was out of the question. 
Nolens then took the opportunity to add that 
the necessity to collaborate should not be 
provoked, that one or more other parties had 
to participate and that the parliamentary party 
should be unanimous. And in this way the door 
to collaboration was left ajar. 
 
The background to the intervention of the 
parliamentary party was the concern that by 
excluding the SDAP, they would become totally 
dependent on the ARP, the CHU and the 
Liberals, while in the areas of social security and 
industrial organisation, for example, better 
results could perhaps be achieved with the 
SDAP. Besides this, there were some in the 
parliamentary party and in the Association too, 
who would prefer to work with the SDAP, which 
would make secession not unthinkable if the 
door were to be shut completely. Nothing less 
than Catholic political unity was at stake and at 
a time when the Association was in the middle 
of a difficult transformation to turn it into a 
united, centrally run party, which would only be 
complete with the founding of the Roman 
Catholic State Party (RKSP) in 1926.  
 
The parliamentary party 
in the Lower House did not 
want its hands tied by 
the episcopate 
 
In 1925 the Christian coalition fell as a result of 
the closure of the Dutch embassy to the Holy 
See (the Vatican crisis). The left wing had 
cooperated for strategic reasons – to break the 
Christian coalition. The Catholic parliamentary 
party took this as a classic example of 
provocation and therefore blocked a cabinet 
with the social democrats. In 1935 the Catholic 
parliamentary party forced a cabinet crisis itself 
due to dissatisfaction with the measures to 
reduce unemployment, but were unable to find 
a third party to form a cabinet with the social 
democrats. They succeeded four years later in 
1939, because in the meantime the SDAP, partly 
under the influence of the fascist threat and the 
global economic crisis, had declared that it felt 
that it definitely had some responsibility for the 
state of current society and had removed 
certain ideological obstacles.  
 
During the formation of coalitions in the period 
since the war, with or without the social 
democrats, the doctrine of the last resort has 
sometimes been used as an explanation or 
justification both inside and outside Christian 
democratic circles. However, this fails to 
recognize the original intention of the last 
resort: leaving the door open for collaboration 
with the social democrats, not shutting it. 
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1925  Vatican crisis 
 
On the night of 10 November 1925, SGP 
member Kersten, supported by the CHU, 
tabled an amendment opposing the budget 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to 
have the Dutch embassy to the Holy See 
closed. The next morning, the proposed 
amendment to the budget was adopted by 
52 votes to 42. 
 
For the Catholic ministers, this was a reason to 
resign which led to the fall of the first Colijn 
cabinet. The controversy about the embassy – 
that in 1920 had been converted from a 
temporary to a permanent diplomatic mission – 
was one of the ‘Roman Catholic’ issues which 
completely divided the Christian coalition 
partners in the period 1918-1925. While the 
leaders of the antirevolutionaries were 
constantly trying to temper the unrest 
surrounding advancing Catholicism, it seemed 
that the CHU leaders – partly for electoral 
reasons – wanted to stir it up.  
 
Many Protestants were very worried about the 
prevailing Catholic triumphalism prompted by 
the advance of Catholics at this time. Catholic 
propaganda and missionary activities, the 
founding of a Catholic university and the 
appointment of Roman Catholics to important 
administrative and legal positions, among other 
things, all led to a mounting call for a 
Protestant response. Before the general 
election of 1925 the CHU had declared that it 
would again strive for the removal of the Dutch 
diplomatic mission in the Vatican.  
 
Nevertheless, the CHU took its seat once again 
in a confessional coalition cabinet in August 
1925, now chaired by the anti-revolutionary 
Colijn. As in previous years, during the debate 
on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
an amendment was tabled opposing the 
embassy. The proposer, Kersten, substantiated 
the proposed amendment with the familiar 
orthodox Protestant objections. The diplomatic 
mission was an ‘affront to the Calvinist 
character of the Dutch nation’, because it 
implied a recognition of the ecclesiastical 
power of the Pope. If there was support for the 
amendment from one of the two coalition 
partners, the Catholic participation in the 
cabinet would be endangered. The amendment 
was adopted with support from the CHU 
parliamentary party. 
 
This time the support from the left wing was 
more important than the division between the 
overwhelmingly ‘reformed’ ARP and the mainly 
orthodox-reformed CHU. Liberals, liberal 
democrats, social democrats and communists 
all sided with Kersten’s proposed amendment. 
Not that they agreed with the reasons given by 
the devout Reformed minister – most members 
of parliament did not find his objections to be 
very convincing and actually saw the value of 
the diplomatic post at the Vatican. This was a 
deliberate attempt to bring down the coalition 
cabinet.  
 
A few months later CHU member De Geer 
succeeded in putting together a cabinet 
without a parliamentary majority. In March 
1926, the item in question on the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ budget was again submitted to 
the House for approval. Once again it was 
rejected, this time by 48 votes to 41 and so the 
embassy to the Holy See came to an end.  
 
This event is referred to in the history books as 
‘Kersten’s Night’, but the crisis should really be 
named after the Christian Historical (CHU) 
parliamentary party in the Lower House 
because it had not been willing to put aside its 
anti-Catholic objections and by supporting the 
amendment had brought down the cabinet. 
The Vatican crisis did nothing to improve 
relations. Despite the parliamentary majority 
that the three confessional parties enjoyed up 
until the 1960s, there has never been a fully 
confessional coalition cabinet since 1925. 
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1936  Colijn and the Gold 
Standard 
 
In 1936, after a protracted struggle, Prime 
Minister H. Colijn had to let go of what he 
had proudly reinstated 11 years before: the 
Gold Standard. There was a great deal of 
discussion surrounding the wisdom of 
whether or not to maintain the link between 
the Dutch guilder and the Gold Standard. 
 
The Gold Standard is a system whereby the 
value of a currency is represented by a fixed 
weight of gold. This fixes the currency rates 
between the participating countries. The central 
banks are required to hold sufficient reserves of 
the precious metal or another currency covered 
by gold to act as a guarantee. Like many 
countries in western Europe, in the 1870s the 
Netherlands introduced the Gold Standard. 
During World War One however, along with 
other nations, it too had suspended the link. In 
1925 the Netherlands reinstated it, shortly after 
Germany and at the same time as Great Britain. 
ARP leader Hendrik Colijn was Finance Minister 
in the Ruijs de Beerenbrouck cabinet II at the 
time, and he prided himself that this 
reinstatement was largely due to his stringent 
austerity polity.  
In response to the global crisis which broke out 
in 1929, Great Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries left the Gold Standard again in 
September 1931 and in some cases their 
currency lost a quarter of its value. Other 
countries throughout the world followed suit. 
The cabinets Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III (1929-
1933) and Colijn II and III (1933-1937) decided 
not to leave the Standard, with their main 
argument being that devaluation was currency 
forgery. Eventually, only France, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands were still in the ‘gold 
block’.  
 
The result was an expensive guilder that 
undermined the Netherlands’ competitive 
position. To offset this, the Colijn cabinets 
opted for ‘corrections’ i.e. lowering pay and 
benefits in order to hold down prices. Civil 
servants, teachers and those on benefits 
particularly suffered as a result, while it was 
economically counterproductive because it 
reduced the purchasing power of these groups. 
This was also the effect of other cuts that the 
government considered necessary. A balanced 
national budget continued to be the 
requirement. Colijn remained deaf to the many 
liberal and social democratic economists, 
business leaders and politicians who began to 
argue the case for devaluation, often in a 
personal capacity because their parties were 
divided. In Catholic circles too, resistance to the 
government policy was growing. This put a 
strain on the relationship between the Catholics 
and Protestants but did not go so far as to 
cause a rift between the RKSP and ARP/CHU, 
which would have led to a coalition with SDAP. 
RKSP Finance Minister M.P.L. Steenberghe was 
therefore forced to step down in 1935, after 
calling in vain for the Netherlands to follow the 
devaluation of the Belgian franc.  
 
The government only relented after France 
proceeded to devalue its currency on Friday 25 
September 1936 and the Dutch government 
was informed confidentially a day later that 
Switzerland would be following the French 
example. On the morning of Sunday 27 
September the world was notified that the 
Netherlands would be the last country to leave 
the Gold Standard. In the days that followed, 
the guilder lost around 20 per cent of its value 
and the Netherlands could try to catch up with 
the upward trend in the world economy.  
 
Contemporaries and historians have discussed 
at length whether it was wise to be so resolute 
in holding on to the Gold Standard. The 
accepted view now is that the economic and 
social consequences were serious and that 
compared with countries that were 
economically similar and had left the Standard 
in 1931, the Netherlands did far worse in terms 
of the intensity and duration of the crisis. 
Conversely, Colijn with his image of the strong 
man defending the ‘safe guilder’, i.e. savings 
and pension funds, appears to have taken the 
wind out of the sails of the extreme right wing 
in the Netherlands. 
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1943  Founding of Trouw 
 
On 30 January 1943, the underground ARP 
was given a voice in the form of the 
newspaper Trouw. The illegal newspaper 
shaped the Christian resistance and also 
witnessed several dramatic developments. 
Towards the end of the war Trouw sought 
closer cooperation between the ARP and 
CHU. 
 
The ARP had gone ‘underground’ on 30 June 
1941 when the political parties were banned by 
the German occupying force. Under the 
leadership of its uncompromising chairman in 
the Lower House, Jan Schouten, it was turned 
into an extensive illegal network. From this 
position there was a mounting call in 1942 for 
an ‘own’ resistance newspaper that would urge 
the orthodox Protestant Netherlands to put up 
a fight ‘on principle’. A stand had to be taken 
against both the nazification of the Netherlands 
and the point of view held in other illegal circles 
that after the liberation everything would be 
different and better. Because what grounds 
were there for this optimism given the large 
numbers of people that toed the German line? 
 
There was a mounting call for a resistance 
newspaper that would urge the orthodox 
Protestant Netherlands to put up a fight 
 
The date on which Trouw was established is the 
day that the anti-revolutionary founders, 
including Schouten and the post-war editor-in-
chief Sieuwert Bruins Slot, gave the 
underground newspaper its final name. The first 
edition had already appeared under the 
provisional name of Oranjebode and was 
distributed by a group in the resistance 
organised around Wim Speelman, the son of a 
minister, who had previously been involved in 
the distribution of Vrij Nederland. By the end of 
1942, differences of opinion concerning the 
content of the paper and the organisation 
ended in a rift with editor-in-chief Henk van 
Randwijk.  
 
Following Schouten’s arrest in April 1943, Bruins 
Slot became the editor-in-chief of Trouw. The 
newspaper expanded to become one of the 
largest illegal papers, not least due to the 
widespread distribution system of Speelman 
and his network. Though people of other 
denominations also worked on Trouw and even 
gave their lives for it, the newspaper was seen 
as the voice of the underground ARP. The allied 
CHU had no illegal organisation. Even before its 
dissolution at the end of 1941, the CHU – 
traditionally more loosely organised – was 
already ailing, not least due to the arrest of its 
party chairman Hendrik Tilanus in October 
1940. A number of prominent CHU members 
who before the war had gathered around the 
Christian-Historic newspaper De Nederlander, 
became caught up in the spirit of reform that 
Trouw was fighting for and started to urge for a 
‘breakthrough’ in the old political, social and 
religious affiliations.  
 
In August 1944 Trouw witnessed the most 
dramatic hour of its existence. Twenty-three 
distributors were arrested and executed by 
firing squad, after the newspaper’s 
management had rejected a German ultimatum 
to cease publication of Trouw. An investigation 
later, however, showed that the fate of those 
arrested had already been sealed even before 
rejection of the ultimatum. With the liberation 
in view, Trouw took the lead in its columns in 
advocating for the founding of a Christian 
People’s Party which would bring together the 
ARP and CHU. In a number of articles, Bruins 
Slot gave the merged party a distinctly 
progressive profile, condemning the social and 
economic policy that had been introduced in 
the 1930s under Colijn. The amalgamated party 
would work towards a society based on the 
Bible with more concern for the socially 
disadvantaged, a fairer distribution of incomes 
and ‘work for all’. The progressive merger 
message was received enthusiastically by 
supporters in the distribution network, but was 
vetoed by Schouten after the liberation. ‘I 
haven’t changed’, said the anti-revolutionary 
leader after his return from the concentration 
camp. 
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1945  Founding of the KVP 
 
The Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s 
Party) was founded on Saturday 22 
December 1945 in the freezing cold parish 
hall of the St. Antoniuskerk in Utrecht. To 
distinguish it from the RKSP, the KVP would 
be a party not just with principles but also a 
manifesto, and it would also be open to 
non-Catholics. But in practice, it continued 
in the tradition of the RKSP as a united party 
for Catholics. 
 
Though the ARP and CHU became active again 
soon after the liberation, the leaders of the 
RKSP realized that the Catholic party would not 
be able to return to what it was. More than 
among Protestants, the discussion that had 
been started by the Nederlandse 
Volksbeweging (NVB) (Dutch People’s 
Movement) had gained momentum among 
Catholics. The NVB, set up in the internment 
camp at St. Michielsgestel and founded in May 
1945, wanted to replace the pre-war sectarian 
society with one in which people would no 
longer organise themselves socially, culturally 
and politically on religious and ideological 
grounds, but more on the basis of a set of 
principles. 
 
This ambitious new direction encountered 
resistance in all segments of society. Among 
the old elite there was little willingness to 
change the status quo. In the Catholic 
Netherlands daily life was firmly focused on 
recovery. On the instruction of the bishops in 
the liberated South, the social and cultural 
structure returned and after May 1945 the rest 
of the country followed. Developments were 
similar in other socio-political groups too. The 
scope for a new direction was therefore limited 
to the political arena which the bishops had not 
commented on. The discussion in the NVB was 
thus focused on a new party system with 
parties with a clear party programme and with 
Christianity and Humanism as sources of 
inspiration. This struck a chord mainly with 
young Catholics, who during the occupation 
had grouped around the illegal journals Je 
Maintiendrai and Christofoor, Their leader J.E. 
de Quay, one of the three men from the 
Nederlandse Unie (Netherlands Union), was one 
of the co-signatories to the NVB manifesto. It 
was clear to the leaders of the RKSP that a 
Catholic political organisation remained 
essential, but they recognized the risk that by 
simply re-establishing the pre-war party they 
would deter many young people. To channel 
the discussion on the nature of the new party, 
in the summer of 1945 the Centrum voor 
Staatkundige Vorming (Centre for Political 
Education) was set up. This Centre appeared to 
act as a safety net for Catholic NVB supporters 
who felt snubbed by the NVB because their idol 
De Quay was refused membership of the 
central board because of his prominent role in 
the Nederlandse Unie. De Quay himself was 
persuaded to become chairman of a committee 
at the Centre that would advise on how 
Catholics should act in politics. When at the end 
of September 1945 this committee came out in 
favour of acting independently in politics, the 
argument was decided. 
 
In the following months, passionate debates 
were held in the RKSP on the direction and 
name for the new party, which resulted in the 
founding of the KVP. On 22 December, in the 
icy cold ‘delivery room’, the RKSP leaders 
achieved their goal: a new party of their own for 
Catholics. But not everyone was equally 
enthusiastic. Some Catholics still preferred the 
outcome of the discussions within the NVB: the 
Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) dominated 
by socialdemocrats. 
 
At the first post-war elections, in May 1946, it 
became clear that a similar breakthrough was 
not feasible in the political arena. The results 
showed that the balance of power between the 
political movements was unchanged. Another 
example of the power of the recovery, was that 
the ARP and CHU had even rejected 
collaboration in the form of a federation. 
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1950  Industrial Organisation 
Act 
 
After decades of political and ideological 
discussion between confessionals, liberals 
and socialists, in 1950 the Netherlands 
finally had a Statutory Industrial 
Organisation (PBO), established by the 
Industrial Organisation Act. However, this 
intensely fought political compromise 
between the KVP and PvdA would be short 
lived. The dream faltered because of the 
changed social and economic reality. 
 
In reaction to social abuses in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, Catholic philosophers 
throughout the world developed the first 
corporative ideas for the reform of the social 
and economic order. The early versions of this 
Catholic social theory, explained in the 
encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), advocated 
harmonious collaboration between labour and 
capital in organic structures. According to this 
theory, society is shaped by naturally evolving 
communities, such as families and religious, 
political and professional organisations. Not 
ownership, but the place and function in society 
determined in which community or 
‘corporation’ a person belonged. In 
harmoniously functioning consultative and 
working structures, employers and workers 
could withstand the excrescences of 
competition and the class struggle.  
Alternatives gradually arose from these 
foundations for the liberal free market 
philosophy and the socialist philosophy of the 
state. From the end of the nineteenth century 
onwards, Dutch Catholic leaders, including 
P.J.M. Aalberse and J.A. Veraart, turned these 
ideas into proposals for a Statutory Industrial 
Organisation. Supervised by the government, 
representatives from the unions and employers’ 
associations would be granted regulatory 
powers. During the economic crisis in the 1930s 
the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931), 
which set out the philosophy of subsidiarity, 
added a new momentum. The principle of 
subsidiarity states that a higher authority, such 
as the state, should only be assigned tasks 
when a lower authority, such as an industrial 
board, is unable to carry out these tasks. 
During the interbellum period, Dutch social 
democrats also developed thoughts on a 
Statutory Industrial Organisation in which the 
state was no longer as dominant but played a 
leading role in the social and economic order. 
Although Catholics and social democrats 
started to grow closer during this period on this 
subject, their differences were still too great to 
be able to reach a compromise. But in the post-
war reconstruction period, a breakthrough 
became possible. Both in the Stichting van de 
Arbeid (the consultative body for employers 
and employees) and in parliament, where the 
parties KVP and PvdA dominated, a majority 
could be found in favour of a Statutory 
Industrial Organisation. In 1950 the State 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, W.C.L. van der 
Grinten (KVP), guided the bill through the 
Lower House. The KVP and PvdA were able to 
recognise their ideological contribution to this 
compromise, although it was the KVP led by 
Romme that had achieved most of its demands. 
In 1952 a separate Minister for the Statutory 
Industrial Organisation was appointed: A.C. de 
Bruijn of the KVP party.  
The Social and Economic Council (SER) became 
the highest authority of the Statutory Industrial 
Organisation. The organising committee of the 
SER set up around 20 industry boards and 15 
product boards in the first few years. In the 
beginning, interest in the Statutory Industrial 
Organisation was still reasonably high in the 
agriculture sector, which pleased KVP cabinet 
members concerned with PBO affairs. But once 
the economy started to flourish and the 
industrial sector no longer wished to be 
involved, developments came to a halt in the 
mid fifties. Employers, in particular, who saw no 
point in external regulation, pulled out. After 
that, the employee organisations gradually lost 
interest too. The economy had changed in the 
meantime, social relationships had become 
more equal and prosperity had increased. Years 
later it became clear that the Statutory 
Industrial Organisation did not fulfil the role 
that its supporters had envisaged and gradually 
its objectives and structure were adapted to the 
new reality.  
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1953  Founding of the Dutch 
‘equipe’ 
 
‘Essentially, this is an invitation to join in the 
papal power struggle’, was the reaction of 
CHU committee member Van Niftrik in 
November 1953 to the invitation to his party 
and the ARP from the KVP to join the 
Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), the 
European alliance of Christian Democratic 
parties. Both parties nevertheless decided to 
accept the invitation. 
 
In 1947, the KVP was one of the co-founders of 
the NEI; the ARP and CHU kept their distance to 
begin with. The initial reserve of the Protestant 
Christian parties could be explained by a 
number of factors. Firstly, on the basis of their 
guiding principle ‘God, the Netherlands and 
Orange’ they had a problem with relinquishing 
sovereignty to a supranational European 
authority, strongly advocated by the NEI. In 
addition, the NEI was mainly Catholic, like most 
of the other West European politicians involved 
at the inception of European integration: the 
German Federal Chancellor Adenauer, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Schuman and 
the Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi. All the 
more reason for Drees in 1952 to urge that a 
non-Catholic (the independent Beyen) be 
appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
provide a counterweight to ‘Papal Europe’ 
given the predominance of Roman Catholic 
politicians on the European stage. 
 
Attempts made by the ARP immediately after 
the war to set up their own Protestant Christian 
alliance with Swiss and West German kindred 
spirits came to nothing. The Dutch political 
system was an exception within Europe, with 
three (actually four: the SGP was not even 
included) separate Christian parties in 
parliament. In other West European countries, 
inter-confessional Christian Democratic parties 
had existed since the end of the war. In 1953 
the Protestant Christian parties became part of 
this European reality: the ARP and CHU joined 
the NEI and, together with the KVP, formed a 
joint ‘equipe’ (or team). 
 
It was clear that European 
collaboration between the KVP, 
ARP and CHU was inevitable and 
could even have added value 
 
In addition, in September 1952 all three parties 
had joined the Christian Democratic group in 
the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel 
Community. The first chairman of this group 
was Sassen – one of the leading ‘Europeans’ in 
the KVP. Even more than party leader Romme, a 
number of his protégés, including Klompé and 
Schmelzer, put a lot of effort into European 
cooperation. Another important figure was the 
tireless Karl Hahn, a naturalized cosmopolitan 
who had fled after the Kristallnacht (1938) from 
Czechoslovakia to the Netherlands. Between 
1955 and 1960 Hahn was Foreign Secretary for 
the KVP and as Director of the International 
Christian Democratic Centre until 1980, he 
acted as an intermediary between Christian 
Democrats throughout the world. In the late 
1950s he was already calling for a Christian 
Democratic party to be formed in the 
Netherlands. Within the ARP and CHU there 
were fewer members who were enthusiastic 
about Europe: pioneers like Bruins Slot and 
Schmal had to set about convincing their party. 
 
Early in 1954 the sceptic Van Niftrik actually 
joined the board of the Dutch ‘equipe’. One 
year later he was one of the most fervent 
advocates of extending CHU membership of 
the NEI that initially had been arranged for one 
year. It was clear that collaboration between the 
KVP, ARP and CHU in Europe was inevitable and 
could even have added value for the three 
parties So the European ‘equipe’ unintentionally 
also served as an initial experiment in forming a 
Christian Democratic party in the Netherlands. 
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1954  Episcopal mandate 
 
On Sunday 30 May 1954, a pamphlet 
entitled The Roman Catholic in public life 
was sold for 25 cents at church doors 
throughout the country. In it, the bishops 
urged Catholics to remain united. Those who 
disregarded the message would be punished 
by the withholding of the sacraments. The 
48-page pamphlet was greeted more often 
with indignation than approval. 
 
The bishops had been concerned for some 
time. The 1947 Welter list of parliamentary 
candidates that went on to become the 
conservative Katholiek Nationale Partij (KNP), 
weakened the political unity of Catholics. 
Within the KVP there was a right wing stirring 
things up, which led to the Catholic Workers 
Movement (KAB) threatening to start its own 
workers’ party. In the Lower House elections in 
1952, the KNP gained two seats, and the KVP 
lost its position as the largest parliamentary 
group to the PvdA.  
 
To the church authorities in Limburg, this 
election gave cause for the bishops to call for 
clear guidelines for the organisation of Roman 
Catholic public life, which resulted in the 
Mandate. The bishops were harsh in their 
judgment of ‘unchristian movements’: 
liberalism, humanism, communism and 
socialism. It was feared that these movements 
would lead to ‘a decrease in religiousness 
resulting in a weakening and decline in moral 
standards’. Their own Catholic organisations 
offered the best guarantee of a society with a 
Christian character. So membership and 
support of ‘non Christian’ organisations like 
VARA (public broadcasting association) and the 
Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
(NVV) (Dutch Association of Trade Unions) were 
forbidden. But the episcopate did not dare to 
go so far when it came to the PvdA and the 
message was limited to advising against. 
 
This fanatical and rigid approach to the issue of 
Catholic unity caused great agitation. The KVP 
was certainly not expecting Episcopal 
intervention. People were more surprised than 
pleased about it. The Mandate was not 
considered to be conducive to the ‘unity 
discussion’ between the KNP and the 
Katholieke Werkgemeenschap (KWG) (Catholic 
Workers Community) in the PvdA that had been 
started in 1952 at their own initiative. People 
also feared that this would damage the 
Catholic-Labour (‘RC-red’) cooperation in the 
government. 
 
The PvdA was especially offended to have been 
labelled as an unchristian movement, even 
though many confessional members of 
Christian denominations had found a political 
haven within the party. The Mandate was seen 
as a deliberate attempt to influence political 
freedom of choice in favour of the KVP. 
Although the NVV broke off cooperation with 
the KAB in the Council of Trade Union 
Confederations, the PvdA leadership did not 
allow the situation to escalate into a split with 
the KVP. They restricted themselves to 
organising meetings where members could air 
their injured feelings. The parliamentary debate 
in the Lower House on the speech from the 
throne in 1954 and again in 1955 was 
dominated by the Mandate, and this was the 
price the KVP had to pay. A further price was 
the failure of the unification talks. The KWG 
members defied the moral dilemma posed by 
the Mandate and remained with the PvdA. The 
KNP returned to its roots. 
 
The feelings evoked by the Mandate damaged 
the relationship between the KVP and PvdA. 
When the ‘RC-red’ collaboration collapsed at 
the end of 1958, the effect of the Mandate had 
actually worn off. Earlier that year the bishops 
acknowledged that certain statements had 
been given a different emphasis. The 
withdrawal of the prohibitory clause followed in 
the mid 1960s. Looking back, the Mandate can 
be seen as a last ditch attempt by the bishops, 
in opposition to the trends of the time, to 
directly influence the political choices of Roman 
Catholics. 
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1956  Marga Klompé, the first 
female Minister 
 
‘Gentlemen, I’m Marga’, was how Minister of 
Social Work, Marga Klompé, introduced 
herself in October 1956 to her colleagues in 
the Drees IV cabinet. Until then cabinet 
members had called each other by their 
surnames. There were also other practical 
consequences to the entry of the first 
femaleminister. The table legs in the 
meeting room of the Trêveszaal, for 
instance, were sanded down so that the 
minister would not ladder her nylon 
stockings. 
 
An ambitious shopkeeper’s daughter from 
Arnhem, Marga Klompé studied chemistry in 
Utrecht, taught at Mater Dei secondary school 
in Nijmegen, a girls’ grammar school, and 
during the war was active in the Union of 
Women Volunteers and the resistance. In 1945 
she joined the KVP, where she felt at home on 
the left wing. Although women had been 
eligible to stand for election since 1917, before 
1940 there had been only two female Catholic 
members of parliament. The CHU already had 
its first female member of parliament in 1922, 
Frida Katz, and quite some time later Jacqueline 
Rutgers followed for the ARP in 1963. 
 
The appointment of Klompé as Minister 
was the crowning glory for emancipation 
In 1946 Klompé helped to start the Catholic 
Women’s Debating Society (KVD), a pressure 
group to increase the number of Catholic 
women in the public and political arenas. The 
KVD lobby proved successful: in 1946 Netty de 
Vink was sworn in as a member of parliament, 
while Marga Klompé and Agnes Nolte followed 
in 1948. Wally van Lanschot became a member 
of the party executive and in 1953 KVD member 
Anna de Waal became the first female Secretary 
for State for Education, Culture and Science. De 
Waal would later leave the KVP because of its 
position on New Guinea. The appointment of 
Klompé as minister was the crowning glory for 
emancipation. She remained a faithful member 
of the KVP. 
 
Thereafter the number of women politicians 
steadily rose, in other parties as well, which was 
the prelude to what would much later, in 1981, 
lead to regular meetings between female 
members of parliament, the All-party Women’s 
Caucus. For a long time all female politicians 
were unmarried – married women belonged at 
home with their family. Klompé also supported 
this view and for that reason advised a number 
of women not to choose a career in politics. It is 
ironic that the more successful she became as a 
politician, the further she distanced herself from 
the (Catholic) feminist movement. As a full time 
politician, she did not want to be identified with 
the women’s lib crusade, certainly not when it 
became more radically feminist. Klompé was 
known for her broad interests, including foreign 
affairs. As a representative at the UN Assembly 
and in positions at the Council of Europe and 
the ECSC, she argued for far-reaching European 
integration, based on Christian principles, of 
course. The verbal power of ‘Miss Europe’ was 
legendary: it was said that once in conversation 
with her, you were in danger of falling under 
the spell of her persuasive powers.  
 
Her concern for the weaker groups in society 
was genuine, as demonstrated by the numerous 
talks she gave all over the country and the 
many visits she paid to old people’s homes, 
travellers’ camps and other places. The cynical 
nickname ‘Our Lady of Ever-lasting Welfare’, 
given to her after the adoption of the Social 
Assistance Act in 1963, did not do justice to her 
intentions. Welfare belonged in a humane 
society and should be generous enough to pay 
for extras like flowers on the table. During her 
second ministerial term (this time for Culture, 
Leisure and Social Work), from 1966 to 1971, 
her progressive stance on subsidies made her 
stand out. For a confessional politician in a 
conservative cabinet in the turbulent second 
half of the 1960s, this was remarkable. Shortly 
before her death she said that she would like to 
be remembered as someone who offered 
comfort in troubled and chaotic times. 
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1959  Introduction of the 
Zijlstra rule 
 
In the course of 1959, Minister of Finance 
Jelle Zijlstra devised a method to ensure that 
the state budget, which was getting 
increasingly out of hand, remained under 
control, including in the long term. This led 
to what became known as the ‘Zijlstra rule’, 
in which a balanced budget and financial 
flexibility went hand in hand. 
 
When, after seven years as Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Jelle Zijlstra (1918-2001) 
joined the De Quay cabinet in 1959 as Minister 
of Finance, he anticipated one problem. He 
would undoubtedly be bombarded with costly 
demands from fellow cabinet members on 
behalf of their own party without regard for the 
state of the country’s finances. Zijlstra was not a 
man to give in easily, but he did not want to be 
viewed as a perpetually tight-fisted killjoy 
either. So he opted for a watertight budget 
policy based on trends, a policy recorded in the 
history books as the ‘Zijlstra rule’. By doing so, 
he aligned his own beliefs on the need for 
sound financial policy with the Christian 
Democratic principle of steadfast government. 
 
Zijlstra had a lightening career behind him. He 
spent a happy childhood in Oosterbierum, 
Friesland, growing up in a Dutch Reformed 
family. He always remained true to his religion 
and anti-revolutionary roots, although he does 
not seem to have been a great admirer of 
Colijn’s crisis politics of the 1930s. He went on 
to become a promising economist and before 
the age of thirty had been made Professor at 
the VU University Amsterdam. In 1952 he made 
the switch to politics. With his extensive 
knowledge of business and his self-assured, 
though not arrogant, demeanour he soon felt 
at home in The Hague where he made an 
impression with his clear line of reasoning. 
 
The budget was to be 
established on the basis of 
the long-term growth in 
national income 
 
His professional skill was exemplified by the 
‘Zijlstra rule’. It essentially entailed that budgets 
would no longer be based on the fluctuating 
economic climate, but on a long-term analysis 
of the growth in national income. If national 
income rose, revenue from tax would rise too 
so there would be more money to spend, but if 
national income dropped then there would be 
less scope for spending. By establishing in 
advance what the trend was and then 
determining the total amount available for 
spending before fixing the annual budget, 
Zijlstra gained three advantages: department 
ministers with the largest expenditure were 
forced to divide the money among themselves, 
the Minister of Finance was spared the constant 
begging of his colleagues, while short-term 
economic fluctuations could be more easily 
cushioned and expensive, long-term projects 
better planned.  
 
Zijlstra had enough command to ensure his 
policy worked reasonably well, but his 
successors were soon struggling. He was quick 
to notice this. When he became President of 
the Central Bank of the Netherlands (DNB) in 
1967, he saw with increasing frustration how 
budgetary discipline began slackening, deficits 
increasing and inflation rising. When he was 
young, politicians had appeared incapable of 
dealing with the economic crisis and now it 
seemed that many politicians were equally 
powerless to deal with inflation. Zijlstra 
challenged them with comments like ‘Rampant 
inflation is a revolution without loss of blood’, 
confirming his roots in the antirevolutionary 
tradition in which the irrefutable principles of 
sound financial management and good 
stewardship are the hallmarks of steadfast 
government. 
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1962  The ‘Mammoetwet’ 
 
In 1962, after twelve years in preparation, 
the Secondary Education Act, that would 
become known as the ‘Mammoetwet’, came 
into effect. It ended the fragmented 
legislation on education by regulating 
education in all areas, from primary 
education to university education, in one 
Act. However it led to differences of opinion 
between Protestants and Catholics. 
 
The Peters-Van Sleen motion (KVP, PvdA) 
tabled in 1949 unintentionally set off a large-
scale overhaul of the Dutch education system. 
Both members of parliament wanted a 
‘cohesive education system’ with a view to 
slightly extending compulsory education. The 
Minister for Education, F.J.Th. Rutten (KVP) 
responded with a Policy Document on 
Education which later became known as the 
First Policy Document on Education, or the 
Rutten Education Plan. In this Policy Document 
Rutten, whose own background was in 
education, set out plans to reorganise the 
entire education system from primary to 
universit y education. The existing system was 
not based on a pupil’s capacity and had too 
many ‘dead ends’ when it came to further 
education. Rutten introduced the foundation 
year in secondary education which was the 
same for all types of education. After this year 
pupils could choose further education 
appropriate to their level and where necessary 
switch directly to a different type of school. 
In 1952 Rutten was succeeded by fellow party 
member Jo Cals, who would make the 
reorganisation of the Dutch education system 
his life’s work. While Rutten had wanted to 
reform the system gradually in separate Acts for 
each type of education, Cals put the entire 
secondary school system into one framework 
law, the Secondary Education Act. The decision 
to do this in one single law was for ARP 
member of parliament A.B. Roosjen reason 
enough to label it the ‘Mammoetwet’ (literally, 
the mammoth act). Although he did not mean 
this in a positive sense; as far as he was 
concerned, this law should have remained in 
Wonderland.  
After the submission of the Rutten Education 
Plan in 1951, it would take another eleven years 
before the Mammoetwet would make it to the 
statute books. This was mainly due to changes 
in thinking on education which occurred when 
Rutten took office at the Ministry of Education, 
Art and Science (OK&W). Until the 
administration of his predecessor, education 
policy had been distributive in nature (mostly 
limited to the allocation of funds to eligible 
schools). Rutten however launched a 
constructive policy in which the Ministry of 
Education became closely involved in education 
matters. The Protestant Christian sector of 
society, in particular, education organisations 
and the political parties, had great difficulty 
with this. They felt that freedom of education 
was under threat, especially now that the 
founding and funding of private schools would 
require ministerial approval. As a result, a large 
section of the ARP party in the Lower House 
and all the CHU parliamentary party voted 
against the Mammoetwet. As the VVD also had 
serious objections, the opposition party PvdA, a 
fervent supporter of reform in education, was 
therefore needed to ensure a majority vote for 
Cals’ life’s work. 
The Secondary Education Act introduced new 
types of secondary schools, such as mavo and 
havo (lower general secondary education and 
higher general secondary education, 
respectively) and atheneum, an extension of 
hbs which granted direct access to university 
education. Cals also started the development of 
secondary schools which offered various levels 
of education under one roof, known as 
scholengemeenschappen (combined schools).  
 
The general features of the Mammoetwet can 
still be found in today’s education system. 
Although major changes were introduced with 
the Basic Secondary Education Act and the 
studiehuis (independent learning), the levels of 
education Cals introduced (with the exception 
of mavo and lbo which merged to form vmbo) 
are still recognizable, as well as the educational 
thinking upon which the system is based.  
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1963  Christian Democracy and 
development aid 
 
When the Marijnen cabinet took office in 
1963, for the first time in Dutch politics a 
member of government was appointed to be 
responsible for development aid. The first 
State Secretary was I.N.Th. Diepenhorst 
(CHU). Later too, the post was often filled by 
Christian Democrats, usually as Minister 
without portfolio. 
 
A number of developments early in the 1960s 
contributed to the creation of a cabinet post for 
development cooperation. Many of the former 
colonies had become independent. In the 1950s 
these countries had been supported by the 
West to prevent them turning communist. 
However, this suggested that money was paid 
to dubious regimes and that the native 
population did not always benefit. In 
September 1961 the American President John F. 
Kennedy gave a speech at the UN General 
Meeting where he called for a ‘decade of 
development’. The best way to combat poverty 
was through coordinated action. 
 
At home, various groups supported 
development aid and many citizens were also 
strongly in favour. Much of this support was 
based on religious and humanitarian motives. A 
lobby also came from the business sector, in 
particular from large export companies. They 
feared a rise in international competition 
because other countries gave ‘tied’ 
development aid, where the aid had to be spent 
on products from the donor country. As a 
result, the business sector called for tied 
development aid. They were successful in this in 
the 1960s and the proportion of this type of aid 
increased. 
 
So there were various motives behind 
development aid. The Christian Democratic 
vision focused on the responsibility of the 
individual. Development aid was renamed 
development cooperation because the term 
‘aid’ had a paternalistic connotation. To the 
Christian Democrats this meant that the starting 
point for development lay with the people in 
the countries concerned. Other organisations, 
including the Ministry of Development 
Cooperation, were there to provide 
encouragement. But the objective remained 
self-sufficiency. Mindful of the principle of 
subsidiarity, as many civic organisations as 
possible were involved to achieve this.  
 
The Cofinancing policy is a good example of 
how the principle of subsidiarity is applied. If 
private organisations are more capable of 
achieving the intended objectives, then this is 
preferable to government intervention. In line 
with this, Minister Theo Bot (KVP) introduced 
the Cofinancing policy in 1965. A similar policy 
had been requested in 1963 by mission 
organisations. The initial intention had been 
that the organisations had to cover 25 percent 
of the expenditure themselves, but this was 
soon abandoned because it was unclear what 
costs came under the 25 percent. This criterion 
was introduced once again by Minister Agnes 
van Ardenne (CDA) in 2007. 
 
Compared to abroad, Dutch organisations 
received a great deal of funding. Increasingly, 
they were acting as implementing bodies for 
government policy. As a result, their position as 
representatives of an engaged civil society 
seemed to be eroding. Making aid more 
effective was therefore one reason for the 
Cofinancing policy. Another means to achieve 
this was the ‘focus countries’, introduced by 
Minister B.J. Udink (CHU) in 1968. These are 
countries that can count on long-term and 
structural support. In the recent Rutte cabinet, 
State Secretary Ben Knapen (CDA) tried to 
increase the effectiveness of aid by reducing 
the number of focus countries. 
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1966  Publication of the report 
Grondslag en karakter van de 
KVP 
 
On 13 January 1966 the Catholic People’s 
Party (KVP) presented the report Grondslag 
en karakter van de KVP (Principles and 
Character of the KVP) at the Nieuwspoort 
press centre. It was the result of a study of 
the party’s fundamental raison d’être. Its 
main conclusion was that the KVP could 
continue for the time being, but it should be 
investigated whether a party could be 
formed on the basis of broad Christian 
principles. 
 
In the early 1960s, sweeping changes were 
taking place within the Roman Catholic church. 
Pope John XXIII called all the bishops to Rome 
for the second Vatican Council (1962-1965) to 
discuss how to bring the church into the 
present day. 
 
Simultaneous discussions were taking place 
within the KVP about the confessional 
principles of the party that had made it so 
important to the Catholic segment of Dutch 
society. Supporters of a general Christian (i.e. 
Christian Democratic) party, advocates of a 
party based on Christian and humanitarian 
principles and defenders of a non-confessional 
centre party, all voiced their opinions. In 1962 
the party leaders decided to create a special 
committee to advise on the principles which 
such a party should espouse. Party chairman 
P.J.M. Aalberse headed this ‘Profiling 
Committee’ that also included former party 
chairman H.W. van Doorn, the Director General 
of the Research Institute of the party J.M. 
Aarden, M. Klompé, N. Schmelzer and party 
ideologist Father Stokman. 
 
The Committee came to the conclusion that the 
formation of a party on the basis of the Roman 
Catholic religion was no longer a matter of 
principle. The Catholic emancipation was a fact. 
The statutory provision that the party ‘accepted 
the word of the ecclesiastical doctrinal 
authority’ should be deleted; the party had to 
become independent of ecclesiastical 
authorities. 
 
In the report Grondslag en karakter van de KVP 
the committee wrote that the Christian vision of 
people and society should provide inspiration 
and direction to political thinking and action. 
The actual worth of people is key, as is the 
understanding that people have to be able to 
live in freedom and be responsible for thems 
lves. This differed from the vision of liberalism 
with its emphasis on the individual, and that of 
socia democracy with its emphasis on the role 
of the government. 
 
And so the Committee concluded that while 
maintaining the Catholic character of the party, 
the long-term pursuit should be the formation 
of a general Christian party together with the 
ARP and CHU. But until this new situation arose, 
the KVP should remain active in the political 
arena. Finally, the KVP should make it possible 
for non-Catholics who endorse the party 
manifesto to represent the party in public 
bodies. 
 
KVP discussions on the report’s conclusions 
were complicated by political developments. 
After the fall of the Cals cabinet in October 
1966, a cabinet was formed in April 1967 in 
which the KVP, ARP and CHU worked with the 
VVD. This centre-right coalition displeased 
radical KVP members. The discussion was 
therefore not just about the principles, but also 
the direction of the party. 
 
The plunge was taken at the end of 1967. On 8 
December, the KVP party council decided that 
‘at the present time forming a party based on 
Christian principles is desirable provided that 
the character of such a party is consistently 
progressive’, and that ‘together with the ARP 
and CHU, the objective should be to form a 
general Christian people’s party with a 
consistently progressive character, which is 
open to all who endorse the manifesto’. For the 
time being, peace was thus achieved within the 
KVP. 
 
 
Theo Brinkel 
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1966  Schmelzer’s night 
 
‘Well Norbert, that’s the end’, was the 
reaction of Prime Minister Cals when he saw 
KVP party chairman Schmelzer’s motion 
during the suspension of the parliamentary 
debate on the night of 13 October 1966. ‘I’m 
afraid it is, Jo’, Schmelzer replied. At ten 
past five in the morning, the motion was 
adopted and the Cals cabinet fell. 
 
The Schmelzer motion, submitted at the end of 
the parliamentary debate on the budget in 
1967, called for the cabinet to provide a more 
cautious financial policy and better security for 
government spending. The adoption of the 
motion meant the end of the Cals cabinet. 
 
But the main intention of Schmelzer’s motion 
was to maintain unity in the KVP parliamentary 
party. The performance and policy of the 
cabinet, in which the KVP and ARP worked 
together with the PvdA, had from the very 
outset led to division within the Catholic 
parliamentary party. Following the successful 
general election of 1963, there was a party 
majority in favour of continuing collaboration 
with the VVD. The fall of this coalition in 1965 
as a result of the crisis surrounding the 
Broadcasting Act, did not affect this preference. 
The Cals cabinet that was formed without 
holding snap elections, was never very popular 
partly due to the adverse economic situation. 
Both the KVP and the PvdA lost seats at the 
Provincial Council elections in March 1966 
which led to further tensions. A confrontation 
was inevitable. 
Dissatisfaction about the costly plans of the 
Cals cabinet led the right wing of the KVP 
parliamentary party to threaten to support a 
motion of the opposition party VVD during the 
parliamentary debate on the speech from the 
throne in October 1966. To maintain unity in 
the party, Schmelzer submitted his own motion. 
He was largely successful: only four ‘radical’ 
KVP members voted against it. In the months 
following the fall of the Cals cabinet unity was 
maintained. It took until February 1968 before 
the radicals left the KVP parliamentary party; a 
few weeks later they set up the Politieke Partij 
Radicalen (Radical Party) together with political 
sympathizers from the ARP. 
But Schmelzer’s attempt to get the ARP to back 
his motion and demonstrate Christian 
Democratic unity (the CHU also supported 
Schmelzer’s motion) failed however. Party 
chairman Roolvink supported it, but the rest of 
his party refused to abandon their own 
government members. So ‘Schmelzer’s Night’ 
was a setback in the cooperation between the 
three Christian Democratic parties. 
 
After this the PvdA – equally dissatisfied with 
the Cals cabinet – no longer wanted to govern 
with this unreliable and conservative KVP, a 
view reiterated at the PvdA Party Conference in 
1969 in the ‘anti-KVP motion’. This polarization 
of the two parties would hamper the formation 
of a coalition between confessionals and social 
democrats for a long time. 
 
The media also played a role in the aftermath of 
‘Schmelzer’s Night’. Many Dutch television 
viewers witnessed history in the making within 
the KVP. Schmelzer was unable to shake off his 
image as a sly schemer, that would be 
reaffirmed a few months later by cabaret artist 
Wim Kan’s portrayal of him in his New Year’s 
Eve Show (a slick sausage dog with a juicy bone 
in its mouth). The images of the cabinet crisis 
concealed the fact that important political and 
social developments had already been set in 
motion. The general election of 1963 turned 
out to be even worse for the KVP compared 
with the Provincial Council elections in 1962, 
when they hit an all-time low. The relationship 
with the PvdA had deteriorated since the end of 
the Drees cabinets in 1958. And even before 
‘Schmelzer’s Night’, the Catholic trade unions, 
press and broadcasting company had already 
distanced themselves from the KVP. For some 
time cracks had been starting to appear in the 
Catholic segment of society. All these 
developments eventually culminated in 
Schmelzer’s Night. 
 
 
Alexander van Kessel 
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1967  Group of Eighteen 
 
On 24 April 1967 official talks began 
between the KVP, ARP and CHU. A 
committee with six members from each 
party, the Group of Eighteen, discussed the 
principles and substance of Christian 
politics. Although the Group only existed for 
a short period, for the first time the 
possibility of a merger of the three Christian 
Democratic parties was explored. 
 
Before the election of 1967, ARP chairman W. 
Berghuis had proposed talks about the 
fundamentals of Christian politics. He said that 
he wanted one Christian Democratic party 
positioned between socialism and liberalism 
with its own direction, ‘not in the centre’, but 
‘radical’. The ARP had first felt the need for 
change when it lost a quarter of its electorate 
between 1948 and 1963. With Berghuis as 
chairman, a ‘radical evangelical’ path was 
chosen. Berghuis – a Calvinist intellectual – was 
a firm believer in biblical principles. He believed 
that Christian politics was ‘radical, in the sense 
that it was constantly preoccupied with 
reducing politics to its essence and judging it’. 
Moreover, he believed that its evangelical 
foundations made the ARP left wing. 
 
Just like in the KVP, there was 
now a prevailing desire 
in the CHU to form a Christian 
Democratic party 
Berghuis distrusted the KVP on both these 
points. He thought that Catholics played down 
the Christian principles too much and leaned 
too far towards the right. Schmelzer’s Night 
reinforced that feeling and was a reason to 
invite the KVP and CHU for talks on principles. 
 
The election result of 1967, when the ARP was 
again victorious at last, confirmed to Berghuis 
that the course he had chosen was correct. The 
KVP leadership wanted to speed up the 
formation of a Christian Democratic party; a 
large minority of members wanted a left wing, 
radical Christian direction. Although the CHU 
had lost only one seat, the result was still a 
shock. There was a growing sense that the 
Union had lost touch with the modern age. Just 
like in the KVP, there was now a prevailing 
desire to form a Christian Democratic party. 
 
It became immediately obvious that the visions 
of the leading figures in the Group of Eighteen 
were poles apart. At the first meeting Aalberse 
said that the KVP wanted to make haste, and 
Berghuis stated that he only wanted closer 
cooperation on the basis of radical Christian 
politics. After ten months, the Group published 
the memorandum Principiële uitgangspunten 
(Basic Principles) written by anti-revolutionary  
J. H. Prins. The document’s tone was highly 
reformational and it emphasized that Christian 
politicians had to be guided by the Gospel. The 
KVP members could not identify with much of 
this, but still agreed to it which only reinforced 
the distrust felt in the ARP that they were 
opportunists without principles. 
 
After twenty meetings, the Group of Eighteen 
disbanded in September 1969. They made 
some noncommittal recommendations about 
working together during elections but the 
formation of a 
 
new party was no closer. 
The visions 
of the leading figures 
were poles apart 
 
These years, however, did lay the foundations 
for the formation of the CDA. A group of 
‘radical Christians’ in both the KVP and the ARP 
left the party and opted to govern with the 
PvdA on principle. When the KVP radicals 
dropped out, Berghuis lost the little faith he 
had in Christian cooperation and resigned as 
ARP chairman. His political sympathizers 
persisted in trying to enforce a radical 
evangelical ideology. 
 
 
Dik Verkuil 
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1973  Confessionals in the Den 
Uyl cabinet 
 
During the cabinet formation of 1972-1973 
the PvdA, D66 and PPR refused to negotiate 
on their joint election manifesto Keerpunt 
’72 (Watershed ’72). The confessional 
parties, who were deeply divided, were 
astounded by the ‘audacity’ of Jaap Burger 
(PvdA), charged with forming the new 
government, who managed to talk Jaap 
Boersma and later also W.F. de Gaay 
Fortman (ARP) into accepting cabinet 
positions without consulting ARP leader 
Barend Biesheuvel. 
 
It was a ‘red’ cabinet with a ‘white fringe’ in 
stark contrast to the balance of power. In the 
Lower House, the left only had six seats more 
than the KVP, ARP and CHU, but had 
successfully claimed ten ministers’ posts, 
whereas the confessionals had only six. This was 
an important reason for the CHU to drop out so 
that the Christian Democratic parties ended up 
in opposition to one another, instead of 
cooperating. The KVP and ARP tolerated the 
cabinet, while CHU parliamentary party leader 
Roelof Kruisinga wasfervent in opposition. A 
‘political rain check’ was taken on the desired 
unity. 
 
Initially, the four Catholic and two anti-
revolutionary ministers worked with the 
progressive cabinet members in reasonable 
harmony. Despite adverse economic conditions 
and difficult political issues, the cabinet always 
managed to reach agreement after long nights 
of discussion. But gradually irritations surfaced 
among the confessionals, particularly because 
the Prime Minister seemed to act more like a 
party politician than the head of the 
government when searching for solutions. 
Added to which he felt no need to hide his 
contempt for the attempts to form the CDA. 
Right from the start there was little goodwill 
between the Prime Minister and his Deputy, 
Minister of Justice, Dries van Agt. These two 
very different characters would never agree on 
a personal or a political level. In parliament, 
ARP parliamentary party chairman Aantjes 
emerged as the cornerstone of the cabinet, 
while his KVP colleague Andriessen became 
increasingly sceptical. The cabinet regularly 
teetered on the edge of the abyss. 
In this politically divided climate, it was 
remarkable that in the run up to a merger the 
three Christian Democratic parliamentary 
parties held joint meetings from May 1976 
onwards with opposition party CHU. There was 
still a clear desire to continue with the coalition 
after the election though this ‘devotion’ was 
hardly reciprocated. The PvdA actually made 
demands of the confessionals, such as a 
minority position in a subsequent cabinet 
(again) and agreement to four socialist 
proposals for reform. 
After serious clashes between the PvdA and 
Van Agt on issues such as the Bloemenhove 
abortion clinic and war criminal Menten, 
tensions increased even further. Something also 
felt by Ruud Lubbers, the young Minister of 
Economic Affairs. When Lubbers felt that Den 
Uyl had not stuck to the agreement concerning 
the bill on capital gains distribution, he too lost 
faith in the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The 
antirevolutionary ministers De Gaay Fortman 
and Boersma, in particular, kept faith the 
longest in ‘the most left-wing cabinet ever’. 
Boersma was actually exasperated by Van Agt, 
who increasingly started to become an ‘irritant’, 
an accusation he did not deny. 
This all had to do with the surprising 
appointment of Van Agt as the first party leader 
of the Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian 
Democratic Appeal), the name of the merged 
party. In March 1977, the bickering surrounding 
the complex issue of land use policy led to the 
fall of the cabinet, but the worsened 
relationships were at the source. At the general 
election in 1977, Van Agt managed to secure 49 
seats – a modest gain of one seat, but a 
gigantic step forward for Christian Democracy 
given the losses suffered by the Christian 
Democratic parties since 1963. However fragile 
this union was, this single party had emerged in 
spite of – though others would say, because of 
– the events of the Den Uyl cabinet 
 
. 
Wilfred Scholten 
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1975  Aantjes’ Sermon on the 
Mount 
 
While enthusiasm for the CDA at grassroots 
level grew, in the mid 1970s the leaders of 
the KVP, ARP and CHU argued about the 
‘principles’ of the new party. The most 
conspicuous contributor to this discussion 
made his point memorably at the CDA party 
conference in 1975. 
 
On the eve of the first CDA party conference on 
Saturday 23 August 1975, the chairman of the 
ARP parliamentary party, Willem Aantjes, was 
feeling very depressed. The reason was that a 
few days earlier the leaders of the political and 
parliamentary parties of the KVP, ARP and CHU, 
together with CDA chairman Piet Steenkamp, 
had drawn up a draft resolution that he totally 
disagreed with. It was about the Gospel being a 
‘guideline’ for the political actions of the CDA. 
Should party members, and therefore CDA 
delegates too, ‘accept’ the evangelical guideline 
or should they ‘endorse’ it? During a long 
session that went on until deep into the night, 
party members argued about this point and 
eventually a majority of those present voted in 
favour of the term ‘accept’. 
 
Disastrous, Aantjes thought, because if the 
Gospel only had to be passively recognized 
within the CDA instead of actively endorsed, it 
would be far too noncommittal. Aantjes wanted 
a CDA in which the Gospel would be applied ‘in 
actual policies’ as ‘the first and last criterion’. 
The reason behind this apparent harping on 
about principles was that Aantjes believed that 
the only way to prevent the CDA becoming a 
centre party was to be guided as far as possible 
by the Gospel. The course of the new party was 
Aantjes’ real worry; he wanted a ‘progressive’ 
CDA. 
 
The only way to prevent 
the CDA becoming 
a centre party was to be 
guided as far as possible 
by the Gospel 
 
On the eve of the conference, Aantjes put the 
final touches to what would become a 
legendary speech. Trouw journalist Pierre van 
Enk later wrote, ‘the point at issue thundered 
among the crowd, like Moses with the Tablets 
of Stone’. ‘The Gospel contains no direct 
guidelines for political action’, Aantjes told his 
audience. ‘But it does give guidelines for direct 
political action, sometimes even very specific 
ones. Turn to Matthew 25 again: feed the 
hungry, quench the thirst of the thirsty, shelter 
the stranger, clothe the naked, visit the sick and 
imprisoned. We still have to do that today. Two 
thousand years have passed, and look around 
you!’ Little has changed, Aantjes concluded and 
so the world ‘yearned’ for Christian politics. 
‘Politics to speak for those with no voice, to act 
for those who are helpless, to clear a path for 
those who cannot walk, to help those who have 
no helper.’ 
 
The reporter Frits van der Poel of Het Vrije Volk 
saw Aantjes’ lips trembling and realised – as 
others did – that he was witnessing something 
very special: an outpouring of a political 
profession of faith. KRO reporter Ad Langebent 
even made the comparison with the Sermon on 
the Mount given by Jesus Christ, and that 
evening he filled the entire Brandpunt current 
affairs TV programme with Aantjes’ speech. 
 
The CDA never became the party that Aantjes 
envisaged. ‘But’, he said later, ‘I was not anxious 
about whether I would be met with agreement 
or aversion, but whether I would be able to get 
across my vision on the principles of the party. I 
did manage to do that, and it felt good.’ 
 
 
Roelof Bouwman 
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1976  Draft manifesto Niet bij 
brood alleen 
 
It was generally believed that the CDA was 
set up mainly to hold on to the old Christian 
Democratic positions of power. Some 
doubted whether it was possible to combine 
evangelical beliefs with a unique political 
manifesto. Evidence to the contrary came in 
the 1970s when the CDA wrote an election 
manifesto for a single Christian Democratic 
party. 
 
By the end of the 1960s there was scepticism 
on all sides about whether it was possible to 
create an identifiable Christian Democratic 
movement. The merging of the Christian parties 
raised questions even within their own ranks: 
was biblical inspiration a sufficient basis to be 
able to keep making joint and distinctive 
political decisions? There was also widespread 
cynicism among the public who believed that 
the discussion about the principles of the new 
movement concealed the real motive – 
retaining the power of the merged parties and 
halting the (ultimately inevitable) decline in 
their influence. At the KVP autumn conference 
in 1972 Piet Steenkamp emphasized the 
urgency of Christian Democratic cooperation: 
‘the bell has rung for the final round’. 
 
A unique manifesto was drawn up by Piet 
Steenkamp and Bob Goudzwaard and others 
that was partly inspired by church sermons at 
the time on public concerns such as growing 
inequality in the world and the pollution of the 
environment. In the report Op weg naar een 
verantwoordelijke maatschappij (Towards a 
responsible society) (1972) and the election 
manifesto Niet bij brood alleen (Not by bread 
alone) (1977) the basic principles and the 
contours of policy were formulated upon which 
Christian Democracy would be based. 
 
What are the needs and 
the injustices? 
 
In the first place, attention was focused on 
recognizing the signs of the times and acting 
on them. What are the changes, the needs, the 
great injustices and threats in our own 
surroundings and worldwide? Against the 
background of the Club of Rome, there was 
also a discussion within the CDA about how to 
prevent the destruction of the earth. The 
election manifesto Niet bij brood alleen took 
solidarity with the poor elsewhere in the world 
and observance of the rule of international law 
as its starting point. In what direction did the 
solutions lie, not just to achieve the end results, 
but also to identify the necessary instruments 
and the relevant responsibilities, particularly 
those of the individual, their relationships and 
society as a whole? These solutions and placing 
responsibility in the right place had to echo the 
call of the Gospel to foster justice, peace and 
humanity here and throughout the world. 
Documents dating from this period 
demonstrate that distinctive political and social 
choices could indeed be based on biblical 
inspiration and at the same time be attractive 
to a large section of the electorate, as shown by 
the position of the CDA in the 1960s. The report 
Van verzorgingsstaat naar verzorgingsmaat-
schappij (From welfare state to welfare society) 
(1983), written by Dick Kuiper, presented a 
vision of society in which not just government, 
but society too played an important role. The 
title of the report suggests that the answer lies 
in ‘accepted’ responsibility. Clear references 
were made to traditional principles such as 
sovereignty and subsidiarity which – given the 
changed context and the findings of research 
institutes – could be seen as consistent with the 
concept of shared responsibility. 
 
 
Jos van Gennip 
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1976  Founding of the 
European People’s Party 
 
When the European People’s People (EPP) 
was inaugurated on 8 July 1976 the Dutch 
Christian Democrats were present. They had 
played a leading role for years, particularly 
concerning the manifesto. When the 
Christian Democratic character of the EPP 
came under threat following the inclusion of 
conservatives and liberals, the CDA adopted 
a more critical stance. 
 
Long before the formal founding of the CDA in 
1980, the ARP, CHU and KVP had discovered 
common ground in Europe. In the run up to the 
first direct European elections in 1979, together 
with other Christian Democratic parties from 
Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and 
Luxemburg, they set up the EPP. This was done 
completely in line with the Manifesto Principles: 
‘A democratic Europe can only survive if there is 
broad support for it among the citizens. The 
formation of a European party as well as civil 
society organisations is important in this 
context. This is how we can focus on mutual 
processes of integration and removing borders.’ 
Piet Bukman of the CDA was one of the first 
chairmen of the EPP (1985-1986). 
 
Agreement was fairly easily reached on the 
manifesto for the new party – that was classical 
in the Christian Democratic sense but with the 
added ideal of a European federation. KVP 
member Karl Hahn played an important role. 
But it was more difficult to reach a consensus 
when it came to the new name: should the term 
‘Christian Democracy’ be used or not? 
Eventually, a compromise was reached: the 
‘European People’s Party of Christian 
Democratic Parties’. The subtitle, a goodwill 
gesture to the Dutch, would soon become 
obsolete. By opting for the first half of the 
name, the door was left open to non-Christian 
Democratic centre parties – which were disliked 
by the Dutch. The membership issue upset the 
Dutch Christian Democrats in particular. Was it 
conceivable that the British Conservatives could 
join the EPP? To the German CDU, it was 
unthinkable that only Christian Democratic 
parties could become members of the EPP. 
Following intense debate, the matter was 
decided in favour of those who supported a 
restriction on membership. They believed that 
this was the best way to safeguard the Christian 
Democratic character of the party. 
 
Gradually, the CDA accepted the 
inclusion of conservative and 
liberal parties in the EPP 
 
But this would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. The 
revival of the European integration process, in 
which the role of the European Parliament 
grew, and with it the power of its parties, the 
EPP was once again faced with issues from its 
early days. Should it remain a separate political 
movement with the risk of marginalisation in an 
ever-expanding European Union, or should it 
form an alliance with other like-minded parties 
with the risk of losing the Christian Democratic 
identity? The prospect of new member states 
joining, often without affiliated Christian 
Democratic parties, also played a part in the 
discussion. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
resolutely steered the EPP towards the second 
option. Gradually the CDA accepted the 
inclusion of conservative and liberal parties in 
the EPP. The diminishing share in power of the 
‘traditional’ Christian Democrats had a lot to do 
with this, of course. The CDA nevertheless 
remains an important ideological source for the 
EPP. This was already the case in 1992 with the 
‘Basic Programme of Athens’, and would appear 
still to be true with the new ideological 
manifesto that the EPP will endorse in autumn 
2012. 
 
 
Steven Van Hecke 
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1977  Van Agt and Wiegel at Le 
Bistroquet 
 
On 17 November 1977 a remarkable photo 
appeared in the newspaper Het Vrije Volk: 
Dries van Agt and Hans Wiegel having 
dinner together at restaurant Le Bistroquet 
in The Hague. After seven months of failed 
talks with the PvdA, the CDA was looking to 
cooperate with the VVD. In Le Bistroquet the 
foundation was laid for an unexpected 
cabinet that did not go down well with all 
Christian Democrats. 
 
The first Van Agt cabinet was controversial in 
more ways than one. Firstly, it signalled the end 
of the pursuit of the distribution of knowledge, 
power and wealth, the policy of the progressive 
Den Uyl cabinet (1973-1977) that fell due to a 
conflict on land use policy. The relationships 
between the progressive parties (PvdA, D66 and 
PPR) and the confessional parties (ARP and 
KVP) had already been put to the test in this 
cabinet. The impassioned Prime Minister Joop 
den Uyl and the intractable Minister of Justice 
Dries van Agt personified this strained 
relationship.  
 
At the conference of December 1976, Van Agt 
was appointed leader of the list of candidates 
for the first joint candidacy of the KVP, ARP and 
CHU. In his conference speech, he uttered the 
famous words that symbolised the future 
course of the CDA: ‘We bow neither to the left, 
nor to the right’. Van Agt went into the election 
arguing for an ethical revival. In contrast to the 
socio-economic ideals of the PvdA, the CDA put 
forward immaterial goals like the restoration of 
Christian values on issues such as abortion.  
 
Following the election result of 1977, a second 
Den Uyl cabinet seemed inevitable: the PvdA 
gained 10 seats, achieving a record number of 
53 seats, while the CDA ended up with 49 seats 
But following the difficult coalition negotiations 
the PvdA conference placed demands 
onministerial appointments, among other 
things, and the CDA eventually could not, or 
would not, agree to these. On 4 November 
1977, after seven months of negotiations, Den 
Uyl, who had been charged with forming a 
government, handed back his failed assignment 
to the Queen. The CDA then approached 
Wiegel’s VVD that had won 28 seats. During 
and after the dinner at Le Bistroquet, Wiegel 
and Van Agt quickly developed a basis for trust. 
Within a month a coalition agreement was on 
the table and the unexpected CDA-VVD cabinet 
was sworn in.  
 
The Van Agt-Wiegel cabinet led to discord 
within the CDA. Six, later seven, CDA 
parliamentary party members, including Willem 
Aantjes, Sytze Faber and Jan Nico Scholten, 
disagreed with this centre-right coalition but 
decided to tolerate it anyway. The small 
majority of 77 seats made the position of these 
‘loyalists’ significant, certainly when it came to 
sensitive issues like the boycott of the apartheid 
regime in South Africa and the deployment of 
nuclear weapons. The policy document Bestek 
’81 (Plan ’81) dated 1978 contained a long-term 
plan to cut back the increase in government 
expenditure that had occurred during the Den 
Uyl cabinet. Parliamentary opposition to this 
plan from the loyalists and others hindered its 
implementation. In addition, there was 
disagreement between the ministers Andriessen 
(Finance) and Albeda (Social Affairs) about the 
effects of the plan. Andriessen felt he was not 
supported by the cabinet and resigned in 1980; 
a serious setback that reflected the unstable 
position of the cabinet. 
 
No significant reforms were carried out during 
the Van Agt cabinet and the budget deficit 
actually reached an all-time high. But looking 
back Van Agt did see some good in this first 
cabinet: ‘We actually paved the way for 
Lubbers. We created the impetus for change in 
the social climate, though the results were not 
obvious during our term in office. We just 
created the right conditions. When Lubbers 
took office the seeds had already been sown 
which could be harvested in the years that 
followed.’  
 
Remy Luyten 
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1978  Grondslag en politiek 
handelen report 
 
Can a non-Christian join the CDA? This was a 
key question for the three founding parties 
KVP, ARP and CHU in the run up to the 
merger that formed a single Christian 
Democratic party. Emotions ran so high, 
particularly after Aantjes’ ‘Sermon on the 
Mount’, that the merger was in jeopardy. 
The report Grondslag en politiek handelen 
(Principles and political action) settled the 
issue in 1978. 
 
It became clear in the 1970s that the new party 
would be a Christian Democratic one. But how 
Christian is Christian Democratic? They did not 
want to become a religious party nor be 
associated with a particular denomination. But 
what did they want? The discussions on the 
party principles that went on between 1972 and 
1978 had two separate phases. Up until 1975 it 
was mainly KVP party chairman Dick de Zeeuw 
who argued for a CDA that was as open as 
possible, thus to non-Christians as well. The 
question was whether humanism could also 
count as a ‘source of inspiration’ besides 
Christianity? This met with resistance within the 
ARP and CHU and many members within the 
KVP also felt this ‘generalisation’ went too far. 
The matter was settled in the spring of 1975 at 
a conference in Woudschoten: the new party 
would accept the Gospel only as its guide for 
political action. 
 
Quite unexpectedly, this agreement seemed to 
prompt a second round of discussions on the 
party principles. The key question being: can 
delegates of the new CDA also be held to that 
one common Christian principle? The first CDA 
conference in 1975 was dominated by this new 
discussion. Aantjes’ ‘Sermon on the Mount’ 
certainly reduced the issue to a matter of 
principle: ‘[The Gospel] is our guideline. 
Whoever is privileged to be called to represent 
the CDA, should reflect this in their political 
actions. The Christian Democratic Appeal must 
adopt this principle if it is to be truly Christian 
Democratic.’ The discussion about the course of 
the CDA simmered in the background: how 
progressive should it be? The ‘new threshold’, 
as it was termed by KVP leader Frans 
Andriessen, met with resistance from the KVP 
and CHU, and even from Aantjes’ own ARP 
party. 
 
The ‘bomb’ 
was defused by a 
broad committee 
 
After the parliamentary elections, the ‘bomb’ 
was defused by a broad committee led by CHU 
chairman Otto van Verschuer, assisted by Arie 
Oostlander, director of the Kuyperstichting. The 
ultimate report, entitled Gronslag en politiek 
handelen, referred mainly to the ‘response 
philosophy’ formulated by Steenkamp in the 
Nota van de Contactraad (Policy Document of 
the Liaison Council) in 1972. It introduced the 
term ‘political conviction’ into Christian 
Democratic thinking as the basis for the party’s 
political action. The ‘Holy Scripture’ is at the 
heart of the CDA’s political activities, but its 
political conviction shows how this is reflected 
in practice. What united the party was not the 
Gospel itself, but the political conviction that 
was formulated in response to the call of the 
Gospel. Oostlander later wrote that the CDA is 
‘a political organisation that draws its 
conclusions as conscientiously as possible from 
the evangelical calling’ and ‘unites those who 
together try to understand the call…and put 
this call into thoughts and deeds.’ It is for this – 
the political consequences, the political 
response – that a CDA member of parliament or 
councillor can be held accountable. 
 
It was nothing short of a fundamental 
breakthrough and as a result, the CDA, as a new 
Christian Democratic party – more so than the 
three founding parties – could direct itself 
towards the entire Dutch population without 
discriminating on the basis of either religious 
conviction or social position. It opened the door 
to anyone who defended the political 
convictions of the CDA, even if they didn’t call 
themselves a Christian. 
 
 
Jan Schinkelshoek 
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1981  Foundation of the CDA 
 
When Piet Steenkamp, the man who had 
brought the KVP, ARP and CHU together 
was asked by the speaker if he would like to 
close the meeting in 1972 ‘appropriately’, he 
clearly felt uncomfortable. A prayer of 
thanks to close a political meeting, in 
accordance with good reformed tradition? 
Even for Steenkamp that was going too far. 
Not knowing what to do, he turned to the 
chairman. Being a Protestant, the chairman 
looked back at him, equally blank. 
 
On 11 October 1980 the Christian Democratic 
Appeal Party was officially founded. It 
represented not only a merger of three 
Christian parties, but also the merger of three 
different cultures. These different ‘clans’ 
continued to be visible in the party’s day-to-
day affairs even after the foundation. The 
differences went beyond the contrast between 
Rome and the Reformation. Anyone in the 
know could tell at a glance whether they were 
dealing with a Dutch Reformed politician or a 
Christian Reformed politician. If you wanted to 
see the difference, you only had to come on a 
Tuesday morning to the old building of the 
Lower House where the parliamentary parties 
prepared their week’s business. The KVP party 
gathered on the second floor (‘closest to 
heaven’), the ARP on the ground floor 
(‘representing God’s Kingdom on earth’) with 
the CHU party on the floor in between. Around 
noon the waiters would set off from the Foyer 
to serve the members. You could see where 
they were heading from the drinks on the tray: 
beer for the KVP, Dutch gin for the ARP and 
sherry and wine for the CHU. 
 
To the outside world, the differences were a 
caricature: the relaxed Catholics, relying on the 
power of numbers, the principled anti-
revolutionary ‘brothers’ and, in the middle, the 
amiable peace-keeping Christian-Historians. 
But there were indeed clear differences that 
stemmed from ancient traditions. It makes quite 
a difference if you view man as a ‘social being, 
made to cooperate with others’ or as a ‘fallen 
sinner’. Are you in politics to ‘show mercy’ or to 
‘suppress the dissoluteness of humanity’? Is it 
about ‘The Glory of God’ or can you be satisfied 
with less? 
 
Each ‘clan’ 
could be distinguished 
by its drinks 
 
The KVP was a typical emancipation party. 
Removing inequalities required a huge, united 
effort cutting right across internal social and 
regional differences. The CHU was long 
renowned for the ‘upper class gentlemen with 
double-barrelled names’ who moved easily 
within Dutch society. At CHU conferences, the 
party – devoted to Queen and country – voted 
using little orange flags. The anti-
revolutionaries, originally the party for the 
Christian Reformed ‘ordinary man’, always 
began their meetings with Bible reading and 
prayer before continuing with heated 
discussions; sometimes so heated that the 
leaders spoke of ‘strident ordinary men’. 
Everything seemed to boil down to principles. 
 
Partly under the influence of Christian unity in 
the 1960s and ’70s, the Christian Democrats did 
grow closer to each other. But it took a huge 
effort after the merger in 1980 for the CDA to 
reconcile these differences. This was made very 
clear by how the ‘clans’ vied for position in the 
single party. What was first a means of standing 
out to the grassroots (Catholic, Christian 
Reformed or Dutch Reformed), soon became a 
method to gain ground: ‘Another CHU member 
is needed’, ‘the Catholic south is under-
represented’. It was obvious that opposite a 
Catholic Prime Minister (Lubbers) there would 
be a Protestant party chairman (De Vries and 
Brinkman), or vice versa (Verhagen and Van 
Geel opposite Balkenende). Even today, the 
issue of Catholic or Protestant supremacy in the 
Christian Democratic representation in the 
Lower House or cabinet is still a thorny one. 
 
 
Jan Schinkelshoek 
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1982  Wassenaar Agreement 
 
The Wassenaar Agreement, concluded 
between the two sides of industry on 19 
November 1982 at the home of Chris van 
Veen, chairman for the 
employers, was little more than an A4 sheet. 
Short enough to be read three days later in 
its entirety by Prime Minister Lubbers during 
the government statement. 
 
In the Agreement, officially named ‘Main 
recommendations on employment’, the trade 
unions accepted wage restraint in exchange for 
a reduction in working hours and redistribution 
of employment, so that (often flexible) jobs 
would be created and employers could invest 
more due to lower costs. Work was put before 
income. The compromise was the result of 
negotiations between Wim Kok, chairman of 
the trade union federation FNV, and Chris van 
Veen, chairman of the Confederation of 
Netherlands Employers VNO, who had been 
Minister of Education for the CHU in the 
Biesheuvel cabinet, and two adjutants. The 
agreement was then signed by all employer and 
employee organisations affiliated to the Dutch 
Labour Organisation. 
 
The economy had been going downhill since 
the mid 1970s: government spending was out 
of control and the performance of the 
commercial sector was in decline. More than 
eight thousand businesses went bankrupt in 
1982, unemployment was rising by fifteen 
thousand a month, particularly among young 
people. For a long time, the greatly polarized 
political and labour relations had stood in way 
of decisive action to combat the problems. 
During the final stages of the cabinet formation 
of the first Lubbers cabinet, Ruud Lubbers and 
the proposed Minister of Social Affairs, Jan de 
Koning, (both CDA members) had already 
threatened to intervene in wages, putting the 
social partners under pressure. They were given 
until 1 January to come to an agreement. Kok 
and Van Veen eventually opted to sort out the 
issue themselves, without government 
intervention. The urgent social and economic 
necessity, coupled with the government 
pressure, forced them to find a compromise. 
 
Employer and employee organisations 
eventually opted to sort 
out the issue themselves 
 
From now on the social partners would work 
together. The Agreement thus served as the 
impetus for the so-called ‘polder model’ which, 
under the ‘purple’* cabinets (with the CDA in 
opposition), was admired abroad. The notion 
was fully in line with the ‘harmonious’ 
philosophy of the Christian Democrats and the 
typical CDA notions of shared responsibility and 
a responsible society. The Agreement also 
provided a flying start to the Lubbers cabinet 
(CDA-VVD), that had been sworn in two weeks 
before on 4 November. It was soon clear that 
the cabinet was not afraid of taking difficult 
measures. Civil servants’ wages and social 
security benefits were cut, under great public 
protest. This contributed to the ‘no-nonsense’ 
air of the new cabinet and its Prime Minister. 
Lubbers reaffirmed his image as a Macher, even 
though he had only taken over the CDA 
leadership from Van Agt in the latter half of 
October. He had previously actually frustrated 
spending cuts proposed by the first Van Agt 
cabinet when he was leader of the 
parliamentary party. 
 
Lubbers ended his government statement on 
22 November by saying: ‘Our society is in the 
depths of winter. We cannot ignore this; the 
question is how do we deal with it? Each of us 
in his or her own way: to the best of our ability, 
not opposing each other but alongside one 
another.’ A prime example of Christian 
Democratic politics. 
 
* combination of red (labour) and blue (liberal) 
parties 
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1986  CDA wins 54 seats 
 
3,170,081: that was how many people voted 
for the CDA on 21 May 1986. Until then, no 
other political party had drawn so many 
people to vote for party leader Ruud 
Lubbers, or any another candidate. Nor had 
a political party ever had such a large 
majority of the 150 seats in the Lower 
House. 
 
The result in May 1986 could be described as 
historic. The number of seats won by the CDA 
broke all records. Although in 1989 the CDA 
received an even larger percentage of the 
votes, the number of seats remained 54. 
 
As with every election and campaign with a 
unique, unexpected result, legends were born 
on the evening of the election result. A 
persistent tale among opinion makers was that 
party leader Ruud Lubbers was able to gain so 
many seats with his CDA party due to the 
secular voters. Apparently, they appreciated the 
‘no nonsense’ business-like manner of the 
Prime Minister and did not much care about 
the deeper vision or party philosophy. Lubbers 
was also very popular among Catholic voters 
who had always admired this young, dynamic 
kindred spirit. In addition, the economic climate 
was favourable to Lubbers. After the difficult 
decade of the 1970s, by the mid ’80s the 
reforms in spending were paying off. 
 
The CDA had gained 750,000 voters compared 
to 1982 when the turnout was disappointing, 
especially in traditional CDA areas. These 
newly- won votes were mainly from young 
people with an increasingly non-religious 
background. Four percent of secular voters 
chose the CDA compared to two percent in 
1982. A substantial increase, but still relatively 
small in relation to the total electorate. 
 
The large electoral gains were 
in the commuter belt and better 
neighbourhoods: the Netherlands’ 
western conurbation had 
rediscovered the CDA 
 
A large part of this increase was, of course, due 
to the strong ‘mobilisation’ of CDA voters, 
particularly those under the age of 40. The 
number of votes for the CDA among all young 
people aged between 18 and 25 increased from 
16 to 25 percent. The number of votes from 
orthodox Protestants was also high which was 
remarkable in view of Lubbers’ Catholic 
background. The media played an increasingly 
important role. On the Sunday before the 
election a party leaders’ debate was broadcast 
in which Joop den Uyl and Ed Nijpels were at 
each other’s throats. Lubbers, the statesman, 
did not get involved which prompted viewers to 
choose him as the winner of the debate. 
 
The CDA won in all regions. Although the 
increase in Limburg was very small, as it was 
among the more orthodox Catholic voters. The 
major electoral gains were achieved elsewhere 
in the Netherlands – in the commuter belt and 
the ‘better neighbourhoods’ where D66 and the 
VVD had their supporters. The Netherlands’  
western conurbation had apparently 
‘rediscovered’ the CDA. 
 
Party leader Ruud Lubbers tried to slip in 
unnoticed at the CDA celebrations at the 
Pulchri Studio in The Hague. He would have 
liked a moment of peace to gather his thoughts 
before plunging victoriously into the crowd of 
jubilant CDA supporters, perhaps even to have 
a quick shave as he was known to do. But the 
Prime Minister, the man of the moment, didn’t 
get his own way in all things that evening. A 
lady in a polka dot dress saw him sneaking in 
and ran excitedly towards him. Molly de 
Koning, the wife of the Minister of Social Affairs 
and Employment, was followed by the press in 
hot pursuit. 
 
 
Pieter-Gerrit Kroeger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
1994  Operation Heerma 
 
In the third Lubbers cabinet CDA State 
Secretary Enneüs Heerma introduced 
sweeping reforms in public housing. Instead 
of centrally-organised mass production, he 
made way for demand-driven players on the 
local housing market. The housing 
associations were made independent and 
were given a prominent role, which they 
filled not to everyone’s satisfaction. 
 
Heerma will go down in history not just as a 
struggling opposition leader during the ‘purple’ 
coalition, but also as the pragmatic 
administrator he proved to be as State 
Secretary for Public Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment between 1986 and 1994. 
He was raised in a Reformed, Frisian farming 
family and after graduating in Political Science, 
he became an alderman for the CDA. He 
became State Secretary after Gerrit Brokx had 
to resign prematurely due to a construction 
subsidies fraud affair during the Lubbers II 
cabinet. The centre-right coalition wanted to be 
rid of the overgrown welfare state through a 
policy of decentralization and restructuring of 
expenditure. Heerma’s portfolio was well suited 
for this. 
 
No interfering with kitchen units 
 
Public housing costs had risen in the past 
fifteen years from two to fourteen billion 
guilders Moreover, several predecessors had 
tried in vain to break open the national 
construction industry. Heerma said for a long 
time that he was ‘reading up’ on the 
complicated subject matter. But in fact, he had 
mastered it almost straightaway. In the 1989 
policy document Volkshuisversting in de jaren 
negentig (Public housing in the 1990s) he 
presented a comprehensive plan and used his 
authority to implement this new policy. The 
CDA cabinet member put a stop to government 
interference at the level of kitchen units and 
privatized municipal house building and rental. 
The government was to be concerned with 
policy and inspection. In his opinion, 
commercial rental agencies and housing 
associations had a much better understanding 
of supply and demand. 
 
The State Secretary gave the associations, that 
had previously been closely controlled by 
government, all possible freedom. They now 
had to focus particularly on vulnerable groups, 
but were also to be judged on their 
performance. They had to be independent, find 
their own funding on the capital market and 
build up their own emergency funds. This 
financial privatization culminated in a number 
of independent advisors devising the idea of 
‘grossing up’. All outstanding loans for housing 
association properties could be offset against 
the subsidy obligations that the government 
had entered into: around thirty billion guilders. 
This relieved the state budget considerably 
which was very welcome in view of the 
requirements for the new monetary union in 
Europe. 
 
Heerma’s grossing up operation illustrates his 
management style. Using his political allies, he 
made it clear to the housing associations that if 
they rejected the deal they would be made 
redundant due to cutbacks. The sector gave in. 
The agreement was signed on a Friday night at 
Hotel Château Marquette, on the outskirts of 
Heemskerk, on the back of Heerma’s cigar box. 
 
The Christian Democratic principle of 
subsidiarity was at the basis of operation 
Heerma. The independence of the housing 
associations was reinforced. Furthermore, 
Heerma confirmed the position of tenants’ 
associations. He gave them the right to appoint 
one of the housing association’s board 
members and encouraged residents to work 
together in one national tenants’ association. 
This move however did not have the desired 
effect in all areas. Heerma also allowed for 
volunteer administrators to be replaced by well-
paid directors whose policy in the following 
years frequently attracted public criticism. In 
this light, Heerma’s work also embodies the 
CDA’s struggle to revitalise civil society. 
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1994  Election defeat 
 
The election defeat of the CDA in 1994 
signified a watershed in the political history 
of the Netherlands. The loss of twenty seats 
brought to an end the Christian Democrats’ 
pivotal position in the political arena and the 
certitude of their right to govern. For the 
first time since 1918, they found themselves 
in opposition. 
 
In the post-war period the key position of the 
KVP, ARP and CHU had been so certain that it 
did not matter to the parties whether they 
governed with the socialists on the left or with 
the liberals on the right. This complacent 
attitude was illustrated by the anti-
revolutionary Bauke Roolvink who in the 1960s 
uttered the wellknown saying: ‘het is lood om 
oud ijzer’ (it’s six of one and half a dozen of the 
other). This key position was held not merely 
due to the efforts of the three Christian parties, 
but also because the PvdA and VVD refused to 
work together after Liberal leader P.J. Oud 
stated in 1959 that ‘governing with the PvdA 
would precipitate the downfall of the Dutch 
nation’. 
 
In the 1994 election campaign, D66 leader Van 
Mierlo again attempted to put an end to this 
animosity. His politics were aimed at displacing 
the CDA from the centre of power, and bringing 
the PvdA and VVD together under the slogan: 
‘this is the moment’. His strategy was helped by 
the fact that this was the first election since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of 
communism meant that a large impediment to 
a coalition between socialists and liberals had 
been removed. To the Christian Democrats the 
end of the ideological struggle between 
capitalism and communism meant that its role 
as mediator between capital and labour had 
lost its relevance. For the Catholics, this 
bridging role had been an important 
justification for their political existence since the 
papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in 1931 
had pointed to this ‘third road’. 
 
No predictable power base 
 
The authority of the Christian Democrats was 
based mainly on its mediation role, which was 
firmly rooted in the social and economic order 
of Dutch society reflected in the consultation 
model between government, employers and 
the unions. Rapid post-war reconstruction had 
been possible due to this model; it had ensured 
reasonably harmonious social relationships, 
controlled wage trends and, in particular, stable 
labour relations. In the early 1990s, the 
explosive growth in the number of people on 
work disability benefits highlighted the 
downside of the close relationships between 
these three parties. Lubbers’ quote ‘the 
Netherlands is sick’ dates from this period. One 
of the reasons for the defeat in 1994 was a 
difference of opinion between himself and Elco 
Brinkman, the successor he had appointed, on 
the issue of how and especially at what pace 
the patient should be cured. The closer the 
election came, the clearer this difference 
became to the outside world. Brinkman wanted 
drastic measures and to ‘freeze’ all benefits for 
four years. This meant deviating from the policy 
of the Lubbers’ cabinets which allowed for an 
annual review to check whether the link 
between benefits and wages should be 
removed. But, rather than arrogance, it was 
more the assurance of power that had crept in 
during the 1980s as a result of Lubbers’ 
successes that misled his impetuous successor. 
When member of parliament Van Iersel was 
quoted as saying ‘we run this country’, his 
words took on a life of their own and became 
the symbol of this certitude. 
 
The election defeat of 1994 made clear to the 
CDA that it could no longer count on its 
electoral power base. From now on, the party 
would have to fight for the trust of the 
electorate. The second lesson was that the 
centre of the Dutch political arena was no 
longer the exclusive domain of the CDA. It 
would now have to present itself with a clearer 
ideology.. 
 
 
Hans Goslinga 
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1995  Nieuwe wegen, vaste 
waarden 
 
Nieuwe wegen, vaste waarden (New roads, 
firm values) (1995) is the title of a CDA 
report written by the Advisory Board set up 
in 1994 and chaired by Frans Andriessen. 
After the election defeat of 1994 this report 
provided the basis for a reorientation 
process. It was also an important document 
in Jan Peter Balkenende’s ‘political arsenal’. 
 
Immediately following the election defeat of 
1994, the CDA set up two committees. One 
investigated the election defeat, the other, an 
Advisory Board, looked to the future with a 
long term vision for the party. The CDA was not 
part of the new cabinet and so it was free to 
reposition itself with support from the CDA 
Research Institute. How could the apparent 
crisis of confidence between the voter and the 
CDA be repaired? Was it possible to modernize 
the traditional philosophy inspired by religious 
faith and to make it fit for an increasingly 
secular society? The Advisory Board put forward 
a longterm plan for the next fifteen years, 
setting out the strategic choices for Christian 
Democratic politics. 
 
The ‘no nonsense’ policy was abandoned. The 
party distanced itself from policy decisions that 
were strongly driven by the economy and 
debates on spending cuts. Social values come 
under pressure when the focus is on only the 
economy, competition and the market. 
Creativity and competition create a more 
dynamic society, but cooperation and solidarity 
are just as important. Sustainability ensures that 
the qualities of current society continue into 
future generations. Without direction prosperity 
can turn into poverty where commercial 
considerations are geared to the widest 
possible target group. Greater flexibility at work 
can turn into less time for friends and family. 
‘We don’t want a future where children come 
home from school and are greeted by just the 
fridge and the TV’, states Nieuwe wegen, vaste 
waarden. 
 
The Advisory Board called for people in the 
community to take more initiative and 
responsibility. Government should play a more 
supportive role. The reform of the welfare state 
became a spearhead. International 
developments had led to greater freedom and 
competition. The government could rely less on 
its own detailed regulations, steering and 
control. People want to be responsible, to 
experiment and be enterprising. The free 
market system was not a goal in itself, but a 
means to achieve a goal. The government 
would act when fundamental values were at 
stake. Besides the free market system, security 
was also needed but more as a stepping stone 
than an escape. The Rijnland model needed to 
be adjusted, but not done away with 
completely. The ideas of Ab Klink (director of 
the Research Institute) and Jan Peter 
Balkenende (secretary of the Advisory Board) 
can be heard here. In his PhD thesis in 1992 
Balkenende had warned about the influence of 
the state in civil society. In the call for a safe 
society, some recognized the voice of Piet Hein 
Donner (chairman of the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR)). The government 
had to become tougher in the areas of policing 
and the judiciary particularly with regard to 
drugs and illegal immigrants. International 
crime was a threat and the world was not a 
village. Tolerance was no longer an option. 
 
The report called for democratic reform in the 
context of a society in which everyone 
participated. By choosing Balkenende as party 
leader for the election in 2002, the CDA 
personified these new roads and firm values. At 
a time of unrest at home and abroad, 
Balkenende was able to win elections by calling 
for a society with values. 
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2001  Leadership crisis 
 
The conflict surrounding the CDA leadership 
at the end of September 2001, was more 
than just personal. It concerned a 
fundamental difference of opinion on the 
campaign strategy and a struggle between 
politicians in parliament and the national 
party headed by the executive board. The 
crisis did however produce the leader that 
put the CDA centre stage again: Jan Peter 
Balkenende. 
 
In the summer of 2001 a return to the centre of 
power by the CDA was not on the cards. The 
‘purple’ coalition of PvdA, VVD and D66 had 
been in government for seven years. The 
economy was flourishing. Political 
commentators were predicting a third term for 
this coalition. 
 
This belief was reinforced by the unrest within 
the CDA. Since its historic defeat in 1994, the 
party now had its third chairman and third 
political leader. And then in the week of 27 
September to 2 October 2001 came the battle 
between the two most important figures in the 
party: Marnix van Rij and Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer. 
 
The chairman found the campaign 
strategy too defensive, too 
much like ‘catenaccio football’ 
 
Van Rij had been party chairman since 1999 
and was determined to give the CDA a more 
contemporary image and to rid it of its ‘stuffy’ 
image. The closer the general election came, 
the less faith the executive board had in De 
Hoop Scheffer as election party leader. It 
became clear to Van Rij during visits to the 
grassroots that De Hoop Scheffer did not have 
the full support of the party membership. In 
addition, he felt that De Hoop Scheffer’s 
campaign strategy was too defensive, too much 
like ‘catenaccio football’. 
 
For his part, De Hoop Scheffer, an experienced 
parliamentarian, felt obstructed by the personal 
ambitions of Van Rij. He had already been 
asked if he would be prepared to let Van Rij 
become leader for the election. Initially, De 
Hoop Scheffer appeared to be willing to do so, 
but he later changed his mind. He also 
protested against Van Rij’s suggestion that he 
take the third place on the list of election 
candidates. 
 
In that pivotal week at the end of September, 
Van Rij decided to withdraw as a parliamentary 
candidate and resign as party chairman due to 
a ‘fundamental difference of opinion on the 
organisation of the next election’. Then a war 
broke out in the media about the image of the 
party. Newspaper De Telegraaf talked of a coup 
staged by Van Rij against De Hoop Scheffer. De 
Hoop Scheffer said on radio and television that 
he was aware that: ‘Marnix van Rij was always 
after my job.’ The next day, after a long and 
bewildering meeting with the party executive, 
he decided that he would no longer be 
standing as party leader for the election and 
resigned as chairman of the parliamentary 
party. He felt he did not have enough support 
from the party executive. ‘Exit. There was no 
alternative route’, he told the throng of 
journalists waiting outside. 
 
What now? Who would become party leader? 
Suddenly Jan Peter Balkenende arrived on the 
scene: mid forties, from Zeeland and Reformed, 
trained at the CDA Research Institute and for 
the past three years financial spokesman in 
parliament. The party executive were quick to 
act: Balkenende should be the next chairman of 
the CDA parliamentary group. And shortly 
afterwards, he became the new party leader for 
the election. Eight months later the CDA 
became the largest party at the general 
election, which was overshadowed by the 
murder of Pim Fortuyn. Election victory in 2002 
was possible for three reasons: the leadership 
crisis and the choice of Balkenende, the intrinsic 
reforms introduced by people like Balkenende 
and Klink, and the political and social unrest 
which caused the ‘purple’ coalition parties to 
lose and the CDA to come out on top as the 
largest party once again. 
 
 
Pieter Jan Dijkman 
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2006  The Balkenende II cabinet 
and the new healthcare system 
 
One of the most important reforms of the 
second Balkenende cabinet was the 
implementation in 2006 of the new 
healthcare insurance system. Waiting lists 
that were a feature of the healthcare sector 
in the 1990s became a thing of the past. For 
decades, discussions had been held on the 
organisation of this system. Reports from 
both the Research Institute and the CDA 
parliamentary group in the Lower House 
played an important role. 
 
On 1 January 2006 a system of basic healthcare 
insurance became effective that was aimed at 
therapeutic care. This marked the end of a long 
debate on fundamental changes to the 
healthcare system which began with the report 
of the Dekker Committee in 1987. After first 
reaching a stalemate on the set up of a new 
healthcare system, the discussion was 
resurrected in the coalition agreement of the 
Balkenende I cabinet and the Balkenende II 
cabinet put the new Healthcare Insurance Act 
on the statute book. 
 
In the course of the 1980s, it became clear that 
the old supply-oriented therapeutic healthcare 
system was failing. Government interference, a 
complicated finance structure and regulations 
got in the way of providing effective healthcare. 
The Dutch healthcare system was hampered by 
a limited choice for patients, insufficient 
innovation and long waiting lists for certain 
treatments. The new system brought an end to 
the distinction between public health insurance 
funds and private health insurance that had 
existed for more than 65 years. As Hannie van 
Leeuwen, Upper House member, said in the TV 
programme Buitenhof: ‘This new system puts 
an end to the dichotomy in healthcare that we 
have had up till now. People with private health 
insurance on the one hand, and those covered 
by the national health insurance funds on the 
other.’ 
 
To guarantee solidarity and accessibility, 
insurance companies were obliged to give 
everyone basic cover. The policyholder was 
entitled every year to switch to a different 
insurance company, irrespective of their state of 
health. According to the Research Institute, 
market competition would encourage insurers 
to enter into contracts with healthcare 
providers to ensure the best quality at the best 
price. To promote price competition, a fixed 
healthcare contribution per person was 
introduced. Patient demand would steer the 
volume and type of healthcare on offer. 
 
The cost of insurance could now vary between 
companies, but the introduction of a nominal 
health insurance contribution was not 
permitted to lead to unacceptably high costs 
for families. With the new healthcare system, an 
income-related healthcare tax credit was 
introduced for those on low incomes. As a 
result, minimum-income households spent a 
fixed amount of their income on healthcare. No 
contribution was required for children up to the 
age of 18. By introducing this healthcare benefit 
into the tax system, the policy on income and 
insurance was separated. Following the party 
memorandum De moeite waard (Worth the 
effort) a similar system was introduced for 
housing association tenants on low incomes 
and families with children. 
 
An important reason for introducing the system 
was a better focus on the wishes of patients. 
International comparisons in 2011 showed that 
the Netherlands scores well on patient 
satisfaction, waiting times and access to basic 
healthcare facilities. Documents from the new 
Advisory Board in 2012 show that the system 
for long-term healthcare requires some 
adjustment. As experience with the therapeutic 
healthcare system has shown, if we want a 
sustainable healthcare system in the long-term , 
then it must be tailored to the person requiring 
care and not the care provider. By allowing 
users to be in control they will buy the care 
they consider important, where not only the 
physical aspects of care but also personal 
welfare will be better considered. 
 
 
Raymond Gradus 
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2010  Formation conference 
 
One third of the CDA members present on 2 
October 2010 voted against the agreement 
for a coalition with the VVD with backbench 
support from the PVV. An open conflict 
about participating in the coalition had split 
the party. With 68 percent of members’ 
votes Verhagen had been given the green 
light to proceed, but the party conference 
was unable to unite the members. 
 
Though the party had suffered a dramatic 
defeat at the election on 9 June 2010, by the 
end of July after the failure of negotiations for a 
‘purple plus’ coalition, the CDA was 
contemplating forming a coalition with the VVD 
with backbench support from the PVV 
(Freedom Party). The alienation of party leaders 
from the party grassroots appeared to be one 
of the main reasons for the election defeat. This 
was why interim party chairman Henk Bleker 
wanted to involve the members more in the 
procedure – especially now there was a 
possibility of working with the PVV – and 
decided that joining the coalition had to be 
approved by the party conference. This 
sensational decision – CDA members had never 
before been allowed to vote on a coalition 
agreement – led to some concern among 
members who feared that this would cause 
divisions or indecisiveness in the party. But the 
CDA party leaders had faith in a good result. 
 
The media attention was 
overwhelming. 
The NOS broadcast live 
to a record number 
of viewers 
 
At the end of August, an open conflict arose 
between the negotiators Maxime Verhagen and 
Ab Klink. Ultimately Ab Klink resigned as a 
member of the parliamentary party. This 
dispute made the result of the conference even 
more significant than it already was. 
 
On 28 September, the leaders of the three 
parties announced that they had reached an 
agreement. The conference was planned for 2 
October in the Rijnhal in Arnhem. The party 
executive wanted to hold the conference 
quickly. Despite the lack of time to prepare, 
around 4,700 members turned up, almost five 
times as many as at an ordinary conference. 
From half past nine members were queuing to 
enter the Rijnhal. The media attention was 
overwhelming. The NOS broadcast live a 
marathon programme that, at one point, had 
1.4 million viewers glued to their TV sets. This 
was a record in audience ratings: never before 
had so many people watched a live broadcast 
of a party conference. Members were given 
exactly one minute speaking time, though some 
prominent party members were allowed or 
claimed slightly longer. Many former politicians 
spoke out against the agreement. Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin pleaded, ‘Don’t do this to our country’. 
Hannie van Leeuwen called for unity, ‘Whether 
you are in favour or against, we need each 
other’. Opponents pointed towards the 
inadequate protection of religious freedom and 
the rule of law in the PVV and felt that the CDA 
should not become a polarized party on the 
centre-right. Supporters pointed towards the 
content of the coalition agreement; they felt 
that the party should accept the responsibility 
of government, that it was the best option from 
a strategic and political perspective (to take the 
wind out of the sails of the VVD and the PVV), 
they were loyal to the party leadership or 
feared that rejection would increase internal 
divisions Eventually it appeared that the 
agreement was supported by two thirds of the 
members present, while one third – more than 
expected by political analysts – rejected it. 
 
This conference, described by Verhagen as a 
‘celebration of democracy’, removed the final 
obstacle to the formation of the Rutte cabinet. 
But the discussion about this political 
collaboration was by no means over. 
 
 
James Kennedy 
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